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The purposes of this thesis are to propose a quantitative analysis of human and 
organizational factors (HOF) in marine accidents; to optimize hazardous material 
(hazmat) transportations considering marine accident risk and cost; to propose an 
accident risk model for the marine transportation systems; and to assess the availability 
of these systems in a developed dynamic model for further availability and cost based 
design of marine transportation systems. 
Human and organizational factors are one of the most important contributing 
aspects to the cause of accidents. The proposed model of this thesis regarding to HOF 
analysis is made up of two phases. The first phase is the qualitative analysis of HOF 
responsible for marine accidents, which utilizes human factors analysis and 
classification system (HFACS). The second phase is a quantitative analysis using 
Bayesian network (BN) to enhance the ability of HFACS by allowing investigators or 
domain experts to measure the degree of relationships among the HOFs. In order to 
estimate the conditional probabilities of BN, fuzzy analytical hierarchy process and 
decomposition method are applied in the accident model. This quantitative accident 
model will provide help on improving safety and preventing marine accidents. 
Accident risk minimization in transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat) has 
been an active area of study with remarkable improvements in route selection domains. 
Most of the works optimized transportation of hazmat in roads or railways; hence 
marine transportation of hazmat considering the associated marine accident risks has 
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not been studied yet. In this thesis, we propose a bi-objective optimization model for 
transportation of hazardous materials with the concern on accident risk and cost of 
transportation. Moreover, prevention of marine transportation systems from accidents 
requires the use of risk models. Current accident risk models contain many safety 
factors which make the risk analysis complicated. Therefore, another attempt of this 
thesis is to propose a general approach of risk modeling which would be applicable 
without having information on safety factors and for all types of accidents. This 
approach is based on Markov model incorporating with Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) simulation.  
The availability/reliability of a marine transportation system is dependent upon 
the structure of the system. Multi-state weighted K-out-of-N structure is a commonly 
observed structure for marine transportation systems. For this type of system, a dynamic 
model is developed for the availability assessment of these systems. For availability 
assessment, universal generating function (UGF) and Markov process are adopted in 
this thesis. Besides availability assessment, the design of a dynamic multi-state marine 
system is optimized by using Genetic algorithm (GA). The optimization problem is to 
minimize the expected total system cost subject to system availability requirements. 
The objective is to find the optimal design of the systems when state probabilities and 
costs of components vary in time.  
The applications of the proposed models of this thesis are illustrated using real-
world marine transportation systems. The models can be extrapolated to be applied in 
other sectors such as oil or gas industry, and other systems such as the railways, road 
transportation systems, and network systems. 
x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table  3.1. Fuzzy scale in AHP ....................................................................................... 40 
Table  3.2. Corresponding comparison matrix of		ܲ(ܺ = ܵ௦|ܶ = ݐ௣) ............................. 43 
Table  3.3. Conditional probability table for the node X with one parent T. ................... 43 
Table  3.4. Hierarchy of human and organizational errors in the first accident .............. 48 
Table  3.5. Conditional probability of “Not-check-equipment-defective” given 
“Insufficient check” (high) ............................................................................................. 54 
Table  3.6. Conditional probability of “Not-check-equipment-defective” given different 
states of “Insufficient-check” .......................................................................................... 55 
Table  3.7. Conditional probability of “Not-check-equipment-defective” given 
“Insufficient-check” and “Not-enforcing-safety-standard” ............................................ 56 
Table  3.8. Mutual information of prior and posterior probability for each HOF (case 1)
 ........................................................................................................................................ 57 
Table  3.9. Hierarchy of HOFs in the second accident case ............................................ 63 
Table  3.10. Mutual information of prior and posterior probability for each HOF (case 2)
 ........................................................................................................................................ 68 
Table  4.1. Cost, risk and transport times of hazmat containers for the network depicted 
in Figure  4.2 .................................................................................................................... 83 
Table  4.2. Cost, risk and transport times of regular containers for the network depicted 
in Figure  4.2 .................................................................................................................... 84 
xi 
 
Table  4.3. Optimums for the shipment of hazmat containers in routes of the network 
depicted in Figure  4.2 ..................................................................................................... 86 
Table  4.4. Optimums for the shipment of regular containers in routes of the network 
depicted in Figure  4.2 ..................................................................................................... 87 
Table  5.1. Australian commercial shipping occurrences over the 5-year period (2005-
2010) ............................................................................................................................... 98 
Table  5.2. Statistical information of incident and accident probabilities over time ..... 105 
Table  5.3. Number of most significant marine occurrences within Hong Kong waters
 ...................................................................................................................................... 109 
Table  5.4. Number of death caused by different types of marine accidents in Hong 
Kong waters .................................................................................................................. 112 
Table  5.5. Inputs of the coded slice sampling algorithm for accident type 
collision/contact in Matlab R2012a. ............................................................................. 114 
Table  5.6. Estimation of marine accident risks resulted from 1000 runs of MCMC 
simulation. ..................................................................................................................... 117 
Table  5.7. Comparison matrix of estimated accident risk ratios and marine occurrence 
ratios .............................................................................................................................. 119 
Table  5.8. Estimated fitting curves for different accident risks with the goodness of fit 
results ............................................................................................................................ 123 
Table  6.1. Transition and performance rates of broaching machines ........................... 137 
Table  6.2. Parameters in the optimization design problem of broaching machine system
 ...................................................................................................................................... 143 
Table  6.3. Optimization results of the design problem 1 (broaching machines’ utility 
and availability) ............................................................................................................ 144 
xii 
 
Table  6.4. Optimization results of the design problem 2 (broaching machines’ utility 




















LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure  1-1. Flowchart of genetic algorithm .................................................................... 14 
Figure  1-2. The structure of this thesis ........................................................................... 16 
Figure  3-1. The proposed accident analysis framework ................................................. 34 
Figure  3-2. Decomposition method of conditional probability calculation .................... 45 
Figure  3-3. Graphical representation of “inhale vapor” accident with prior probabilities
 ........................................................................................................................................ 51 
Figure  3-4. Posterior probabilities of the human factor given the first accident happened
 ........................................................................................................................................ 53 
Figure  3-5. Effect of change in prior probabilities of each organizational factor on the 
probabilities of the second accident ................................................................................ 59 
Figure  3-6. Graphical representation of the second accident with prior probabilities .... 66 
Figure  3-7. Posterior probabilities of the human factor given the second accident 
happened ......................................................................................................................... 67 
Figure  3-8. Effect of change in prior probabilities of each organizational factor on the 
probabilities of the second accident ................................................................................ 71 
Figure  4-1. Marine hazmat and regular freight transportation network ......................... 76 
Figure  4-2. A hazmat and regular containers’ transportation chain ............................... 83 
Figure  5-1. Structure of the proposed accident risk model ............................................. 91 
Figure  5-2. Markov accident model (λ௞௟: occurrence rate from state k to state l) .......... 92 
xiv 
 
Figure  5-3. Marine occurrence probabilities and occurrence rates for Australian 
commercial vessels in a 5-year time span resulted from 1000 runs of MCMC simulation
 ...................................................................................................................................... 100 
Figure  5-4. The contour plot, surface plot, and residual plot of simulated incident 
probability vs. time and incident rate ............................................................................ 101 
Figure  5-5. The contour plot, surface plot, and residual plot of simulated accident 
probability vs. time and accident rate ........................................................................... 102 
Figure  5-6. The contour plot, surface plot, and residual plot of simulated serious 
incident probability vs. time and serious incident rate ................................................. 103 
Figure  5-7. Error bar plots of marine occurrence rates after running MCMC simulation 
with different initial rates .............................................................................................. 107 
Figure  5-8. Markov accident model (λ௞௟: occurrence rate from state k to state l). ....... 111 
Figure  5-9. Marine occurrence probability trends for vessels moving within Hong Kong 
waters resulted from 1000 runs of MCMC simulation ................................................. 116 
Figure  5-10. Collision risk estimations for different number of vessels moving within 
Hong Kong waters ........................................................................................................ 120 
Figure  5-11. Grounding risk estimations for different number of vessels moving within 
Hong Kong waters ........................................................................................................ 121 
Figure  5-12. Fire risk estimations for different number of vessels moving within Hong 
Kong waters .................................................................................................................. 121 
Figure  5-13. Sinking risk estimations for different number of vessels moving within 
Hong Kong waters ........................................................................................................ 122 
Figure  6-1. A general Markov model for a system with ܰ components, e.g. if all 
components are in state	ܯ − 1, then the system is in state j or above if		 ௝݇ = ܰܯ − 1, 
ݑ௜(ܯ − 1) = ܯ − 1				݂݋ݎ	∀݅ ∈ {1,… ,ܰ}. .................................................................. 129 
xv 
 
Figure  6-2. Markov model of the state transitions of broaching machines in dynamic 
system ........................................................................................................................... 136 
Figure  6-3. State probability distributions of broaching machines for the dynamic 
system ........................................................................................................................... 139 
Figure  6-4. Availability of the dynamic broaching machine system under different 
















LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  
  
HOF Human and Organizational Factors 
HFACS Human Factor Analysis and Classification System 
Hazmat Hazardous Material 
BN Bayesian Network 
CPT Conditional Probability Table 
AHP Analytical Hierarchy Process 
MC Markov Chain 
MCMC Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
GA Genetic Algorithm 
UGF Universal Generating Function 
BNP Best Non-fuzzy Performance 
COA Center of Area 
IMO International Maritime Organization 
MAIB Marine Accident Investigation Branch 
MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet 
VCM Vinyl Chloride Monomer 
PPE Personal Protective Equipment 
ESD Emergency Shut-Down 






CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation focuses on accident analysis, risk and reliability modeling of some 
marine transportation systems. Different kinds of marine transportation systems based 
on their application and structures are investigated. The organization of this 
introduction chapter is as follows. First, some background is provided in the 
introductory part in section  1.1, and then the motivations of research are declared in 
section  1.2 which highlights the aims of study. In section  1.3, some important methods 
and models are briefly presented, which includes human factors analysis and 
classification system, Bayesian network, fuzzy analytic hierarchy process, Markov 
chain, Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation, and genetic algorithm. The research 
scope and the organization of this dissertation are introduced in Section  0. 
 
1.1. Background 
Over the last decade, marine systems played as an important role as highway, rail and 
air systems in international commerce and transportation. Marine transportation systems 
are often comparable with other modes of transportation in relieving congestion, and 
producing more fuel-efficient and economic transportation. Although transportation on 
water is relatively economical and costless, the occurrence of accidents and incidents at 
sea is increasing leading to loss of lives and environmental effects. Therefore, it is so 
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important to keep the marine transportation system safe. However, the desirable safety 
of marine transportation systems requires extensive investigations into the marine 
accident risk and reliability of these systems. 
Among commonly underlined factors leading to marine accidents, Human and 
Organizational Factors (HOF) are leading causes of most accidents. A report of United 
States Coast Guard also points out that 75-96% of casualties are due to some forms of 
human errors (Rothblum 2000). In this aspect, it is emphasized that human factor is one 
of the most important contributory aspects to the causation and avoidance of accident. 
The human factor analysis becomes much more important when a system 
transports hazardous materials (hazmat). Hazardous material transportation is an 
economic activity with increasing volume and potential risk for environment and 
mankind. Most hazmats, such as gasoline, fuel oil, and petroleum, are an integral part of 
our daily lives and industrial development. Flammables, explosives, poisonous and 
infectious substances, radioactive materials, and hazardous wastes are common 
examples of materials in the category of hazmats (Verter and Kara 2008; Jaffin 2012). 
Transportation of hazardous materials in sea comes with some accident risks and the 
possibility of incidents such as spill to sea, fire, and/or explosion. The safe 
transportation of ships containing hazmat is of the utmost concern to researchers that 
has conducted many studies on accident analysis and risk modeling of marine 
transportation systems.  
The concept of risk is used to assess and evaluate uncertainties associated with an 
event. Risk can be defined as a combination of the probability and the degree of the 
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possible human injury, damage to property, and damage to environment. Hence, risk 
can be measured as a pair of the probability of occurrence of an event and the 
consequences associated with the event’s occurrence. The appropriate estimation of this 
probability is a matter of great significance. According to Liu and Zhang (2012), 
accident risk analysis is a process to identify a functional relationship between the 
probability distributions of causes (factors) and accidents using information.  
The risk of marine transportation system’s accident is related to the 
reliability/availability of the system. Reliability is the probability that the system will 
perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated period of time. And, 
availability is the probability that the system is in its intended functional condition and 
therefore capable of being used in a stated environment. Availability deals with the 
duration of up-time for operations and is a measure of how often the system is alive and 
well. 
The availability of marine transportation systems is dependent upon the structure 
of the systems. It can be evaluated by reliability block diagram, which is a graphical 
representation of the logic connections of the system’s components within the system. 
Some common structures that can be observed as a structure of marine transportation 
system are:  
• Single component systems such as a rudder of a ship or considering a vessel as a 
single whole unit. 
•  Parallel systems such as the three parallel generators rated at 270 kW each; if all 
generators fail the power generation system in the ship fails. 
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• Series systems such as the different parts of a tanker or ship hull; if any part is 
holed or cracked deeply, it causes to system’s drowning.  
• K-out-of-N systems, in which at least K components of the system should work 
properly for its operation, such as a 2-out-of-3 high-speed ship engines in which 
at least 2 engines of the 3 available engines should work.    
Sometimes there is a combination of above structures such as series-parallel 
systems. And, sometimes the components of a system have different states, make it as 
multi-state systems. A marine transportation system with M + 1 different states 
(0,1,… ,ܯ) is considered as multi-state system, where state M is the perfect functioning 
state and state 0 is the completely failure state. The states between 0 and M are partial 
failures and do not necessarily cause the system’s shutdown.  
 
1.2. Motivations  
1.2.1. Contribution of human and organizational factors in marine accidents 
It has been widely recognized that human and organizational factors are leading causes 
of most marine accidents (Hetherington et al. 2006; Ren et al. 2008; Trucco et al. 2008). 
The prevalence of HOF in accidents warrants the need to incorporate HOF analysis in 
accident investigations, so that valuable measures to prevent similar accidents from 
recurring can be derived. After the review of different models, Human Factor Analysis 
and Classification System (HFACS) model is selected for HOF analysis in this thesis. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Human factor analysis and classification system is a validated and reliable human 
error model (Wiegmann and Shappell 2001), which is utilized intensively in 
investigating accidents (Shappell et al. 2007; Olsen and Shorrock 2010). However, 
HFACS is a qualitative model and would not be enough for accident risk analysis. 
Therefore, adding quantification analysis to this model is a motivation of this study for 
investigating the contribution of HOF in marine accidents. In this thesis, HFACS model 
is integrated with Bayesian Network (BN) and fuzzy sets as a new approach to model 
quantitative accident risk and deal with uncertainty regarding the observed evidences. 
 
1.2.2. Accident risk in marine hazardous material transportation 
Hazardous materials (hazmat) are potentially dangerous to people and environment 
because of the toxic ingredients they include (Verma 2011). The public is very sensitive 
to the dangers of hazmat transportation activity due to the potential magnitude of 
accidents to the population and the environment. Therefore, the risk associated with 
accidents involving hazmat shipments has found considerable attention from the 
government, encouraging research on hazmat transportation (Caramia et al. 2010). 
The risk involved in hazmat transportation has generally been analyzed in the 
literature from the perspective of potential or future occurrences of release accidents 
(Diaz-Banez et al. 2005; Clark and Besterfield-Sacre 2009). However, most of the 
accident risk analysis and optimization models for hazmat transportations are for 
transportations in roads or railroads and rarely in sea and waterways. Thereupon, in this 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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thesis, we are motivated to develop an optimization model for accident risk analysis of 
hazmats in marine transportation.    
   
1.2.3. General accident risk model for marine transportation 
Quantification and analysis of accident risk plays an important role for the evaluation of 
maritime transportation system reliability. Many factors such as human errors 
contribute to the failure and accident of this kind of systems. Li et al. (2012) had an 
overview on maritime quantitative risk assessment studies. These studies have been 
done to investigate the associations between marine accident risks and the effective 
safety factors (Soares and Teixeira 2001; Toffoli et al. 2005; Attwood et al. 2006; Aven 
et al. 2006; Yip 2008; Kujala et al. 2009; Wang et al. 2011). In the risk estimation 
models of these studies, many safety factors are involved in models that make these 
methods complicated.  
In practice, we should look for a comprehensive method of risk estimation that it 
is even applicable without having enough information on impacting safety factors. In 
addition, most of the recent risk models were proposed for a specific type of accident 
(e.g. collision) or marine system (e.g. tanker) (Friis-Hansen and Simonsen 2002; Chen 
2003; Gucma and Przywarty 2007; Vanem et al. 2008; Mou et al. 2010; Goerlandt and 
Kujala 2011). In this thesis, we aim to propose an approach which has the potentials to 
consider any marine accident or marine transportation system.  
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1.2.4. Availability assessment and design of marine transportation system 
Some recent research works have been devoted to model the availability/reliability and 
design of marine transportation systems due to the importance and wide application of 
these systems (Kwang Pil et al. 2008; Gamidov et al. 2009; Young et al. 2010; Prabhu 
Gaonkar et al. 2011; Thies et al. 2012).  
In spite of vast reliability research, less attention was paid to the reliability-based 
structure of a marine transportation system, while the availability/reliability of marine 
transportation system is dependent upon the structure of the systems. Multi-state K-out-
of-N structure is commonly observed for marine transportation systems. As a result, the 
aim of this thesis is to assess availability of multi-state K-out-of-N structured marine 
transportation systems. In addition, the weights or utilities are considered for the 
components of these systems in different states.   
Most reliability/availability studies of multi-state weighted K-out-of-N system 
pre-assumed that the state probability of system/component does not change throughout 
system lifetime. However, complex systems are often subject to aging process which 
implies that the system/component state probability may gradually change with time 
(Kolowrocki and Kwiatuszewska-Sarnecka 2008). Therefore, it is of large practical 
value to model the availability as a function of time. Our purpose is to assess 
availability for a dynamic model of multi-state weighted K-out-of-N marine 
transportation systems.  
In this thesis, besides availability assessment, we also investigate the best design 
of a dynamic multi-state marine system in a case for each component some weights are 
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assigned in different states. Li and Zuo (2008a) presented a study on reliability optimal 
design of multi-state weighted K-out-of-N systems for a non-dynamic model. In their 
work, the objective was to select the component choices to minimize the system cost 
subject to requirement on system availability. In this thesis, we modify the objective 
function presented by Li and Zuo (2008a) to optimize the cost and find the optimal 
system design in dynamic model. 
 
1.3. Some important methods and models 
1.3.1. Human factors analysis and classification system 
Human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS) is a reliable human error 
model that is able to assist investigators in the identification of human and 
organizational factors (HOFs) and their relationships in an accident. Human error is 
usually defined as any deviation from the performance of a specified or prescribed 
sequence of actions (Leveson 2004). HFACS describes human error at four levels:  
1) The unsafe acts of operators,  
2) Preconditions for unsafe acts,  
3) Unsafe supervision 
4) Organizational influences.  
In other words, the HFACS framework goes beyond the simple identification of 
what an operator did wrong to provide a clear understanding of the reasons why the 
error occurred in the first place. In this way, errors are viewed as consequences of 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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system failures or symptoms of deeper systemic problems; not simply the fault of the 
employee working at the “pointy end of the spear” (Wiegmann and Shappell 2003). 
 
1.3.2. Bayesian network 
A Bayesian network (BN) is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG), where	ܰ = {(ܸ, ܧ), ܲ}. 
V and E are the nodes and edges respectively. P is the joint probability distribution over 
V (Williamson 2005). The nodes represent discredited random variables and arcs 
represent probabilistic dependencies between the variables. As they handle uncertainty 
explicitly, they are suitable for examining systems containing complex and uncertain 
interactions (Helle et al. 2011). 
Each of the nodes in V represents a variable and the directed edges in the set E 
that connect nodes represent the probabilistic dependency. Each node has a number of 
possible values called “states”. Also, each of the nodes in the network is quantified with 
a Conditional Probability Table (CPT), which consists of the conditional probabilities 
given the states of the parent nodes. For each possible state of a node, conditional 
probability is specified with respect to all possible combinations of states of its parent 
nodes. The probabilities describing these relationships between the nodes were obtained 
through structured expert elicitations (Stiber et al. 2004). 
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1.3.3. Fuzzy analytic hierarchy process 
Analytic hierarchy process (AHP) is extensively used as a relative weight estimation 
technique in many areas (Vaidya and Kumar 2006). AHP has the additional advantage 
of being easy to explain to the experts who need assess the different alternatives in a 
systematic way (Aragones-Beltran et al. 2009). However, AHP involves human 
subjective evaluation that necessitates the use of decision making under uncertainty. 
Due to the complexity and uncertainty involved in real world, it is sometimes 
unrealistic or even impossible to require exact judgments. Experts usually find that it is 
more confident to give interval judgments than fixed value judgments (Kahraman et al. 
2003). 
Inability of AHP to deal with the imprecision and subjective in the pair-wise 
comparison process has been improved by fuzzy AHP. Fuzzy AHP, which is an 
extension of AHP, is a useful tool for calculating the priority weight. Fuzzy AHP 
allowed experts to use linguistic expressions or fuzzy numbers to reflect the vagueness 
of human thought (Kahraman et al. 2009). There are many fuzzy AHP methods, among 
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1.3.4. Markov Chain 
Markov chain is about a sequence of random variables which corresponded to the states 
of a certain system. In such a sequence, the state at one time period depends only on the 
one in the previous time period (Ching and Ng 2006).  
Consider a system (S) with m possible states, represented by the set		ܫ =
{1,2, … ,݉}. Let the system S evolves randomly in discrete time	(ݐ = 0,1,2, … , ݊, … ), 
and let		ܬ௡	representing the state of the system S at time n. Then, from Janssen and 
Manca (2006): 
• The random sequence	(	ܬ௡, ݊ ∈ ܰ)  is a Markov chain if and only if for all 
	݆଴, 	݆ଵ, … , 	݆௡ ∈ ܫ, 
ܲ(	ܬ௡ = 	݆௡|	ܬ଴ = 	݆଴, 	ܬଵ = 	݆ଵ, … , ܬ௡ିଵ = ݆௡ିଵ) = ܲ( ܬ௡ = ݆௡| ܬ௡ିଵ = 	݆௡ିଵ) ( 1-1) 
             A Markov chain 	(	ܬ௡, ݊ ≥ 0) is homogeneous if and only if the above 
probabilities do not depend on n and is non-homogeneous in the other cases. 
For more details about Markov chain, Markov process, and Markov models, one 
can refer to Janssen and Manca (2006) and Ross (2010). 
                                                                                                                                                           
1.3.5. Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation 
Origination of Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) was in statistical physics, but has 
been applied in many areas, corresponded to a variety of techniques and methods 
(Kendall et al. 2005). MCMC refers to the utilization of Markov chains for random 
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sampling and approximating the number of states. In other words, MCMC simulation is 
an algorithmic procedure for sampling from a statistical distribution. As a result of 
MCMC sampling, the sequence of points in the parameter space reconstructs the target 
distribution (Aver 2012).  
The underlying principle in MCMC simulation is:  
1) Write a computer program to simulate the Markov chain to sample 
randomly from a specific probability distribution,  
2) Design a Markov chain whose long-time equilibrium is that distribution,  
3) Run the programmed chain for a time long enough to be confident that 
approximate equilibrium has been attained, 
4) Finally, record the state of the Markov chain as an approximate draw from 
equilibrium. 
 
1.3.6. Genetic algorithm 
An evolutionary algorithm is a stochastic process that operates iteratively on a set of 
individuals called population. Each individual is a potential solution candidate of the 
problem. Among the evolutionary algorithms, the genetic algorithm (GA) is the most 
extended applied method that relies on the use of a selection, crossover and mutation 
operators (Fogel 1998). 
Holland (1992) described how to apply the principles of natural evolution to 
optimization problems and built the first genetic algorithms in the year 1975.  
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Figure  1-1 shows the process of simple GA in a flowchart. GA starts with a population 
of possible solutions. Each solution is represented through a chromosome. . Each 
chromosome has an associated value corresponding to the fitness of the solution it 
represents. Selection is done by using a fitness function or cost function that 
corresponds to an evaluation of how good the candidate solution is. The optimal 
solution is the one, which maximizes the fitness function or minimizes the cost 
function.  
The initial population is generated randomly. Then, the genetic algorithm loops 
over an iteration process to make the population evolve. Each iteration process consists 
of the following steps (Sivanandam and Deepa 2008): 
• Selection: Selecting individuals is done randomly with a probability depending on 
the relative fitness of the individuals so that best ones are often chosen for 
reproduction. 
• Reproduction: New solution (offspring) is bred by the selected individuals. For 
generating new chromosomes, the algorithm can use both crossover and mutation. 
The crossover produces an offspring from a randomly selected pair of parent 
solutions, facilitates the inheritance of basic properties from the parents by the 
offspring. Mutation results in slight changes to the offspring’s structure (position 
in the chromosome), and maintains a diversity of solutions.  
 
 


















Figure  1-1. Flowchart of genetic algorithm 
 
Create initial population (randomly) 
Evaluate fitness function 
Store the best individual of the population 
Create new population (generation) 
Optimal or good 
solution found?
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• Evaluation: The fitness of the new chromosomes is evaluated. 
• Replacement: Individuals from the old population are ignored and replaced by the 
new ones. 
The algorithm is stopped when the population converges toward the optimal 
solution. 
 
1.4. Research scope and organization 
The purpose of this thesis is to study human and organizational factors (HOF) in marine 
transportation and model accident risk, reliability, and design in this field for different 
kinds of marine transportation systems. The structure of this thesis is illustrated by the 
flowchart in Figure  1-2.  
Chapter 2 provides a brief literature review on different methods and models on 
HOF investigation, accident risk analysis, availability/reliability assessment, and design 
of marine transportation systems. In addition, the research gap and contribution of the 
dissertation is included in this chapter. From chapter 3 to 6 the main works related to 
accident analysis, risk and availability of marine transportation systems are presented. 
In chapter 3, a quantitative accident analysis model is presented to assess the 
contribution of Human and Organizational Factors (HOFs) in marine accidents. The 
analysis is done by integrating Human Factor Analysis and Classification System 
(HFACS) and Bayesian Network (BN) with fuzzy AHP. This application model 
exploits the advantages of existing methods and modifies them. As an approach to 
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compensate the lack of quantitative analysis within HFACS, the integration of BN and 
fuzzy AHP is selected to estimate quantitatively the contribution of HOFs to accidents. 
At the same time, the 4-level structure of HFACS provides a systematic guideline for 













Figure  1-2. The structure of this thesis 
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The case studies of chapter 3 are related to the accidents which lead to spread 
toxic vapors as a kind of hazardous materials (hazmat). These case studies encouraged 
the author to consider the risk of hazmat for optimizing hazmat transportation in 
different waterways. Thereupon, in chapter 4, a bi-objective optimization model for 
transportation of hazardous materials is proposed. It is intended to determine the 
number of container ships for transmitting hazmat or regular freight from origins to 
destinations in different itineraries. The expected risk evaluated in this problem is based 
on the water area exposed by hazmat containers during shipment in the routes 
(waterways).  
The optimization model in chapter 4 proposes an accident risk function which 
depends only on sea pollution factors. Also, the quantitative model proposed in chapter 
3 is particular and basically dependent on a specific safety factor, HOF. Therefore, the 
lack of a general accident risk model which would be applicable for all types of marine 
accidents is understandable. In this regard, proposing a general quantitative model for 
accident analysis and risk modeling of marine transportation systems becomes a 
necessity and purpose in this thesis. With this purpose, in chapter 5, a new analytic 
approach of accident risk modeling is presented with an application example in marine 
transportation. The approach is based on Markov modeling and Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) simulation. In this model, a simple homogeneous continuous time 
Markov chain is used to record and estimate many marine occurrence rates and 
probabilities. The MCMC simulation only requires the occurrence data of three-state 
Markov model to estimate the accident risk and can be used when only a limited 
amount of information is available.  
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During accident analysis and risk modeling in previous chapters, the different 
state-based structure of the systems draws our attention to analyze accident risk and 
assess availability for multi-state marine transportation systems. Therefore, in chapter 6, 
a dynamic model is developed for the availability assessment of a most common type of 
marine transportation systems called multi-state K-out-of-N systems. Regarding the 
dynamic property of the system and its components, the problem of optimal design of 
the components is solved by using Genetic algorithm. In the dynamic model, the 
probabilities and utilities of components in different states are allowed to be changed 
over time. For availability assessment, universal generating function and Markov 
process are adopted. The application of the proposed model is illustrated using a real-
world marine transportation system in order to evaluate and compare them in assessing 
system availability. Finally, chapter 7 makes related conclusions from each of the four 
but integrated works of this thesis. It also discusses the limitations of the works 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Marine transportation is subjected to many regulations due to the risk, 
environmental/ human cost of marine accidents and the importance of safe and efficient 
operation of ships (Kristiansen 2005). Beside of the regulations which are agreed at the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO), analyzing the safety factors and accident 
risk of marine transportation systems are necessary for increasing the safety and 
prevention of critical accidents. This chapter is the review of marine accident models 
that covers four aspects:  
• Human and Organizational Factor (HOF) as a safety factor in marine accidents 
• Hazardous material (hazmat) transportation 
• Quantitative accident risk analysis of marine transportation 
• Multi-state marine transportation systems and availability/reliability assessment 
Various key research gaps are identified and noted in the literature that helps to 
understand the contribution of this thesis. At the end of this chapter, the research gaps 
are pinpointed again. 
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2.1. Models on HOF investigation in marine accidents 
Many models have been established that discuss HOF in accidents, e.g. Reason’s Swiss 
Cheese Model, Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), 
Classifications of Socio-Technical Systems involved in safety control, Systems-
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (Rao 2007). An inductive reasoning approach 
is employed to develop an Aviation System Risk Model (ASRM) to build probabilistic 
causal models representing the safety risk involved in aviation accidents (Oztekin and 
Luxhoj 2010). ASRM model is based on revised HFACS and reflects the failure/error 
levels imposed by HFACS taxonomy (Reason 1995).  
A set of principles for organizational safety risk analysis are proposed to integrate 
the technical risk analysis models with social aspects of safety prediction models 
(Mohaghegh and Mosleh 2009). Based on these principles, probabilistic risk assessment 
model is extended to include the effects of organizational factors as the fundamental 
causes of accidents (Mohaghegh et al. 2009). Mohaghegh and Mosleh (2009) propose 
organizational safety causal analysis model and present a Bayesian approach to operate 
the multi-dimensional measurements. An organizational factor framework is developed 
for the quantification of the impact of organizational factor on risk, which also chooses 
Bayesian Network (BN) as a quantitative modeling technique based on an element-by-
element evaluation of the existing framework (Oien 2001). However, this model is 
attributed to specific leak events without using extensive resources and does not focus 
on the risk-reducing measures. The Human Factors Investigation Tool and Curtailing 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
21 
 
Accidents by Managing Social Capital are recognized as relatively new tools built 
based on the HFACS model (Gordon et al. 2005; Rao 2007).  
HFACS model can be integrated with BN, which is capable of providing 
quantitative interrelationships as well as calculating numerical values of occurrence 
probability (Ren, Jenkinson et al. 2008). The earliest research in the integration of 
HFACS with BN appeared in Luxhoj and Coit (2006), which construct BBN model 
utilizing the HFACS taxonomy as a basis. Lu (2010) also establishes the causal 
relationships of accidents by using BN from the perspective of HOFs and tries to apply 
the fuzzy semantics and the integral value method to quantify the conditional 
probability table (CPT) of basic events. However, the expert elicitations of CPT and 
quantitative inference of BN may not be enough. In order to modify the deficiency of 
their work, fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (AHP) method and decomposition 
method are adopted in this work to compensate uncertainty and vagueness in the 
experts’ judgment of BN. With regards to the elicitation of CPT in BN, it is worthwhile 
to note that reliable HOF data are generally absent (Grabowski et al. 2009). In such 
situations, CPT can be elicited using judgments from domain experts. However, experts 
may find it difficult to come up with precise probability values for the relationships 
between nodes (Chen et al. 2007). Since BN is an effective tool for updating prior 
probabilities and fuzzy set theory is a useful tool for analyzing subjective information, 
the two theories can be combined for the updates of prior probabilities and the 
calculation of posterior probabilities (Blair et al. 2001). Fuzzy AHP can tackle fuzziness 
and uncertainty of vague decision-making more efficiently using fuzzy sets, 
membership functions, and fuzzy numbers (Lee et al. 2008). 
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There are many fuzzy AHP methods and applications in literatures. The earliest 
work is that a fuzzy logarithmic least squares method (LLSM) is suggested to obtain 
relative weights from a triangular fuzzy comparison matrix (Van Laarhoven and 
Pedrycz 1983). A constrained nonlinear optimization model is later proposed to modify 
the fuzzy LLSM (Wang et al. 2006). An extent analysis method, which has been 
employed in a number of applications due to its computational simplicity, is introduced 
by Chang (1996). However, such a method is found unable to derive the true weights 
from a fuzzy comparison matrix. It is improved by modifying the fuzzy LLSM, which 
can directly derive normalized triangular fuzzy weights for both complete and 
incomplete triangular fuzzy comparison matrices (Wang et al. 2008). In another study, 
fuzzy AHP is combined with HFACS to prioritize the list of HOFs involved in an 
accident (Celik and Cebi 2009). Fuzzy AHP and Fuzzy Data Envelopment Analysis are 
applied to calculate the relative fuzzy weight, which is integrated with BN to create the 
risk evaluation models (Chiang and Che 2010). From above literature reviews, we can 
see that the fuzzy AHP method is an ideal tool for relative weights elicitation, which 
can be used to elicit the CPT of BN. 
 
2.2. Models and problems on hazardous material transportation 
The risk involved in hazmat transportation has generally been analyzed in the literature 
from the perspective of potential or future occurrences of release incidents (Diaz-Banez, 
Gomez et al. 2005; Clark and Besterfield-Sacre 2009). Up to now, most of the studies 
on risk optimization of hazardous material transportations are related to hazmat 
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transportations in roads or railways. Sometimes the problems are called hazmat network 
design, sometimes multi objective hazmat routing or scheduling problems. Whatever 
the titles of the works are, two aspects are considered in the problems: minimum risks 
and less costs (Zhang et al. 2012).  
Many methods are introduced for the selection of best routes in transportation of 
hazmat based on risk analysis (Leonelli et al. 2000; Kheirkhah et al. 2009; Saat and 
Barkan 2011). In some papers, constraints related to hazmat transportation are 
considered for a kind of vehicle routing problem with time windows (Meng et al. 2005; 
Pradhananga et al. 2010).The determination of hazardous materials distribution routes 
can be defined as a bi-objective vehicle routing problem since risk minimization 
accompanies the cost minimization in the objective function. Carotenuto et al. (2007) 
found the minimum and equitable risk routes for hazmat shipments. Erkut and Gzara 
(2008); Bianco et al. (2009) considered a bi-level flow model and a heuristic algorithm 
for hazmat transportation network design problem. In their work, a set of hazmat 
shipments has to be shipped over a road transportation network in order to transport a 
given amount of hazardous materials from specific origin points to specific destination 
points. Verma (2009) developed an optimization model, where cost is determined based 
on the characteristics of railroad industry and the determination of transport risk 
incorporates the dynamics of railroad accident. From the review of recent problems, it 
becomes clear that accident risk definition and determination in hazmat transportation is 
recently under the interest of many researches and still it can be investigated in different 
aspects.  
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2.3. Quantitative marine Accident risk models  
Recently, modeling and quantifying risk and reliability is regarded as one of the most 
important research topics in transportation (Sun et al. 2012). The existing risk analysis 
literature in maritime systems mainly focuses on probabilistic risk analysis arguments, 
simulation modeling, and statistical analysis of data (Uluscu et al. 2009). Early works 
concentrated on assessing the risk of individual vessels or marine structures, but 
recently, probabilistic risk assessment has been introduced in the assessment of risk in 
the maritime domain (Merrick and van Dorp 2006). 
Li, Meng et al. (2012) had an overview on maritime quantitative risk assessment 
studies. Many of these studies have been done to investigate the associations between 
marine accident risks and the effective safety factors. In this area, Wang et al. (2002) 
reviewed some of the published works on assessing ship damage and oil outflow after 
collision and grounding. Pedersen (2010) published a literature review on estimating the 
frequency and consequences of collision and grounding accidents. Wang, Roohi et al. 
(2011) presented a quantitative accident analysis model to assess the contribution of 
human organizational factors in accidents. Yip (2008) used regression method for 
accident risk modeling in Honk Kong waters. Kujala, Hanninen et al. (2009) modeled 
marine risk using ship traffic data and defined risk for one type of marine accidents, 
collision. In the model, accident probability equals to collision probability. Commonly, 
many factors were involved in these studies such as accident count, vessel count, 
weather conditions, size of the vessels, and season.  Attwood, Khan et al. (2006) 
developed a model to predict the frequency of accidents in the offshore oil and gas 
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industry. Aven, Sklet et al. (2006), similarly, designed a model which included many 
input factors for risk modeling. Toffoli, Lefevre et al. (2005) analyzed the accident risk 
based on sea state parameters, such as wave heights and periods. Fowler and Sorgard 
(2000) developed a quantitative risk model called MARCS (Marine Accident Risk 
Calculation System) based on fault tree analysis.  
 
2.4. Availability/reliability modeling of marine multi-state systems 
A multi-state system may have a basic architecture such as series, parallel, K-out-of-N, 
and network. The K-out-of-N structure is a very popular structure of the multi-state 
systems with wide application and research works (Yam et al. 2003; Lia et al. 2006; 
Tian et al. 2009) . Multi-state weighted K-out-of-N system is a generation of multi-state 
K-out-of-N system and it has wide spread applications such as in traffic systems, 
telecommunication networks, and satellites (Li and Zuo 2008a). As is clear from its 
name, weighted multi-state systems are composed of multi-state components which 
have different performance levels and several failure modes. Due to the importance and 
wide application of multi-state systems, many research works have been devoted to 
model the availability/reliability of these systems. In General, there are four approaches 
of modeling:  
1) The stochastic process approach 
Xue and Yang (1995) analyzed the reliability of the coherent multi-state systems 
by combining a Markov model and the structure function of the system. Zhang et al. 
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(2002) formed a replacement policy model for multi-state systems with stochastic 
deterioration process. Lanus et al. (2003) partitioned complex Markov models into a 
hierarchy of sub-models and applied for multi-state telecommunication systems. Later, 
Li et al. (2005) calculate the system reliability again by Markov process, but this time, 
the state sequences of all components were collected periodically, and this information 
was used to predict the reliability of the components in several periods.  
2) The universal generating function approach  
The Universal Generating Function (UGF) was first introduced by Ushakov 
(1986). Later, it was commonly used for analyzing availability/reliability of different 
multi-state system structures such as series, parallel, series-parallel and bridge structure 
rather than multi-state K-out-of-N systems (Levitin 2003; Agarwal and Gupta 2007; 
Tian et al. 2009; Yeh 2009; Levitin 2011; Peng et al. 2012).  
3) The Monte-Carlo simulation technique 
Markov chain Monte Carlo simulation started in earnest by Metropolis et al. 
(1953). Since then, it has become an indispensable tool with applications in many 
branches of science (Kendall, Liang et al. 2005). Simulation approach is applicable for 
availability assessment of most of the multi-state systems. Zio and Podofillini (2003); 
Zio et al. (2004); Ramirez-Marquez and Coit (2005); Ramirez-Marquez et al. (2006); 
Zio et al. (2007) have presented a Monte-Carlo simulation approach to modeling multi-
state system availability. The simulation approach is flexible to model the availability 
of the systems consist of parallel components with load-sharing and parallel 
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components with operational dependencies. However, the main issue and problem in 
using this approach is the long-time taking and the expenses of simulation runs. 
4) The recursive algorithm.  
Huang et al. (2000) have provided a performance evaluation algorithm for 
calculating the state distribution of generalized multi-state K-out-of-N systems. 
However, their presented algorithm is enumerative in nature, and not efficient enough. 
Recursive algorithm is an efficient approach that has been introduced into the 
generalized multi-state K-out-of-N system availability field in the last few years (Tian et 
al. 2005; Zuo and Tian 2006). Zuo et al. (2007) studied the availability assessment of 
two terminal multi-state networks using a recursive algorithm. Tian et al. (2008) also 
developed a reliability bounding approach based on the recursive algorithm. 
Liu and Kapur (2006) developed reliability measures and analyzed reliability for 
dynamic non-repairable multistate systems. In this dissertation, besides reliability 
analyses, we investigate the best design of a dynamic multi-state system in a case for 
each component some weights are assigned in different states. Li and Zuo (2008a) have 
done a study on reliability optimal design of multi-state weighted K-out-of-N systems 
for a non-dynamic model.  In their work, the objective was to select the component 
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2.5. Research gaps 
According to the literature review of accident risk models, the following research gaps 
are identified and studied in this thesis:   
• HFACS is a validated and reliable human error model (Wiegmann and Shappell 
2001), which is utilized intensively in investigating accidents (Shappell, Detwiler 
et al. 2007; Olsen and Shorrock 2010). HFACS is selected for HOF analysis after 
the review of different HOF models. However, the reviewed literatures mainly 
focus on the construction of complicated conceptual model, whereas quantitative 
risk assessment is not enough. Adding quantification analysis to the qualitative 
HFACS model can enhance the accident investigation process. On the other hand, 
the review of many works indicated that although BN gives a sound and 
transparent approach to modeling marine operational risk, it cannot incorporate 
unobserved variables easily, owing to the fact that the size of the conditional 
probability table (CPT) for a child node can become quite large. Therefore, 
HFACS model can be integrated with BN, which is capable of providing 
quantitative interrelationships as well as calculating numerical values of 
occurrence probability (Ren, Jenkinson et al. 2008). Moreover, experts may find it 
difficult to come up with precise probability values for the relationships between 
nodes in BN (Chen, Lee et al. 2007). Since fuzzy set theory is a useful tool for 
analyzing subjective information, the two theories can be combined for the 
updates of prior probabilities and the calculation of posterior probabilities in BN. 
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• Majority of research on hazmat transportation focuses on road shipments (Erkut 
2007), and mostly on route selection and scheduling problems for transferring the 
hazmat (Patel and Horowitz 1994; Dadkar et al. 2008; Verter and Kara 2008; 
Androutsopoulos and Zografos 2010; Caramia, Giordani et al. 2010). In these 
problems, the routes selected can be quite sensitive to the risk function defined. 
Most popular measure of the risk is the expected consequence of the accident 
(Guo and Verma 2010). But, this risk measure may not be appropriate to be used 
in route selection problems when hazmat container ship capacities are not 
considered as variables in the optimization. The reason is that the risk 
consequence such as pollution depends on the amount of hazmat to be transported 
and hazmat release rates. It is clearly understandable that the amount of hazmat 
and the number of hazmat containers may impact on the probability of hazmat 
accidents. When the number of hazmat vehicles is assumed constant in the routes, 
there would be no difference with the risk measured for rare hazmat released 
events and more probable hazmat vehicle accidents. As a result, in this thesis, we 
are not seeking for the best routes to transport hazmat, but we intend to find the 
optimal number of containers with different freights (hazmat and regular) to be 
moved in the preselected routes. A bi-objective optimization model is proposed to 
formulate the problem. Accident risk analysis models associated with the marine 
transportation of hazmat are mostly qualitative in nature. Another serious gap in 
the literature of hazmat transportation optimization problems is the estimation and 
assignment of accident risk and costs to the transportation links. The way of risk 
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estimation to the links is a very important input for marine hazmat transportation 
models and problems. 
• From the review on maritime quantitative risk assessment studies, there is a gap 
that many of these studies have been done to investigate the associations between 
marine accident risks and many specific safety factors. Mullai and Paulsson 
(2011) reviewed the current accident risk models for marine transportation 
systems. They concluded that there is no single model which would be capable of 
serving all types of systems, issues, and needs in marine industry at all times. 
Among all the recent studied models, only their model is applicable for any type 
of accident and ship. However, different types of data are required to be collected 
for each accident type. For example, for the collision frequency model, data on 
“visibility” is required, while for grounding frequency model, data on “ship drift 
speed” is needed in advance. Therefore, it is intended to propose a general 
accident risk model which would be applicable for all types of marine accidents 
and systems. 
• In spite of vast reliability research, less attention was paid to the reliability-based 
structure of a marine transportation system, while the availability/reliability of 
marine transportation system is dependent upon the structure of the systems. 
Multi-state structure is commonly observed for marine transportation systems. Li 
and Zuo (2008b) reviewed the methods for availability or reliability assessment of 
multi-state systems, and applied the recursive algorithm for availability 
assessment of multi-state systems in a non-dynamic model. In light of our 
knowledge, most reliability/availability studies of multi-state system pre-assumed 
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that the state probability of system/component does not change throughout system 
lifetime. However, complex systems are often subject to aging process which 
implies that the system/component state probability may gradually change with 
time (Kolowrocki and Kwiatuszewska-Sarnecka 2008). Therefore, it is of large 




CHAPTER 3: QUANTITATIVE MARINE ACCIDENT 
MODEL WITHIN HUMAN FACTOR ANALYSIS AND 
CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM 
 
It has been widely recognized that Human and Organizational Factors (HOF) are 
leading causes of most accidents. A report of United States Coast Guard also points out 
that 75-96% of casualties are due to some forms of human errors (Rothblum 2000). In 
this aspect, it is emphasized that human factor is one of the most important contributory 
aspects to the causation and avoidance of accident. The prevalence of HOF in accidents 
warrants the need to incorporate HOF analysis in accident investigations, so that 
valuable measures to prevent similar accidents from recurring can be derived. 
Feedbacks and lessons learnt from accident analysis will provide help on improving 
safety climate and preventing accidents. Effectively preventing accidents requires the 
use of accident analysis models that include the effect of HOF (Leveson 2004). 
In this chapter, a quantitative accident analysis model is proposed by integrating 
Human Factor Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and Bayesian Network 
(BN) with fuzzy AHP to assess the contribution of HOFs in accidents. This application 
model exploits the advantages of each method and modifies the existing methods. As an 
approach to compensate the lack of quantitative analysis within HFACS, the integration 
of BN and fuzzy AHP is selected to estimate quantitatively the contribution of HOFs to 
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accidents. At the same time, the 4-level structure of HFACS provides a systematic 
guideline for the construction of BN to model how HOFs are related to form a network.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section  3.1 presents a two-phase 
accident analysis model for the systematical assessment of HOFs in both qualitative and 
quantitative manner. In Section  3.2 and  3.3, two cases are analyzed to demonstrate the 
application of the model. Section  3.4 concludes the merits and drawbacks of the 
proposed model. 
 
3.1. Two-phase accident analysis model 
As reviewed in the chapter of Literature Review, many qualitative models have been 
established that discuss HOF in accidents (Reason 1995; Rao 2007; Shappell, Detwiler 
et al. 2007; Mohaghegh, Kazemi et al. 2009; Oztekin and Luxhoj 2010). But, to assess 
the contribution of HOFs in both qualitative and quantitative manner, a two-phase 
accident analysis model is proposed in this chapter. 
In the first phase, concerning the qualitative analysis of accident, HFACS is used 
to investigate various HOFs causing accidents.  The second phase of the proposed 
model is the quantitative analysis of the HOFs identified in the first phase. This 
quantification process is achieved by using BN. The two-phase accident analysis model 
is shown in Figure  3-1. The proposed model taps on the joint capabilities of HFACS 
and BN for the purpose of investigating HOFs in accidents. 












Figure  3-1. The proposed accident analysis framework 
Accident 
Phase 1: Analysis with HFACS 
• Define the accident of concern 
• Analyze with HFACS. Starting at 
level 0 (accident), work upwards 
to level 1 (unsafe acts), then level 
2 (preconditions for unsafe acts) 
then level 3 (unsafe supervision) 
and finally level 4 
(organizational influences). 
• At each level, identify the human 
errors resulting in each of the 
errors in the next lower level 
(e.g. when at level 1, identify 
unsafe acts that causes the 





Phase 2:  Analysis with BN 
• Nodes (variables) are created from the 
human errors identified. States are 
defined for the variables. 
• Graphical representation of relationship 
between the variables using BN.  
• Following the HFACS hierarchal 
structure, edges are connected from 
nodes in the higher level to nodes in the 
next lower level. 
• Elicit CPT for the nodes in the BN 
using expert opinions via AHP and/or 
the decomposition method.  
• Reasoning and inference using BN and 







(High-Level, Qualitative) (Low-Level, Quantitative)
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• Phase one is a qualitative analysis model of HOFs and their relationships. This 
phase utilizes HFACS to identify a hierarchy of HOFs causing accidents. The 
output of this phase provides the input for the second phase of the model. 
• Phase two constructs a quantitative analysis model of the HOFs using BN. The 
CPTs of BN are elicited by integrating fuzzy AHP with a decomposition method 
to quantify the degree of relationships among HOFs. And then, BN inferences are 
performed to prioritize the importance of HOFs identified in the first Phase. 
 
3.1.1. 6-Step accident analysis model 
The model is made up of 6 steps including: “Define”, “Analyze”, “Node”, “Graphic”, 
“Elicit” and “Reasoning” that briefly called “DANGER”. Here, each step is explained 
in details: 
• Define. This step is to clearly define accidents. The scope of accidents and 
conditions under which the accidents occur should be clearly stated. A statement 
describing the accident should be produced. For instance, “collision between a 
ship and shuttle tanker at night under poor visibility” states the accident of 
concern (ship and shuttle tank collision) and the conditions (night time, poor 
visibility). 
• Analyze. This step utilizes HFACS to identify various HOFs, ranging from active 
errors of operators to latent errors in organization. In general, HFACS has a four-
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level hierarchical structure. Level 1, which is the “unsafe acts” level, consists of 
active errors by the operators. Errors in this layer directly lead to the accident, and 
thus are the most visible to investigators. With the “unsafe acts” errors listed in 
level 1, experts can proceed to investigate the “preconditions for unsafe acts” 
errors in level 2 that influences the HOFs of level 1. After level 2 is completed, 
level 3 “unsafe supervision” can be identified with final leading to level 4 
“organizational influence”. Therefore, beginning investigations at level 1 allows a 
progressive probing of the HOFs at higher levels. This process pushes 
investigators to address latent failures at higher levels of the HFACS model, 
which tend to be overlooked in accident analysis. The output of this step is a 4-
level hierarchy of HOFs. Utilizing HFACS effectively requires understanding the 
definitions of different type of HOFs at each level.  
• Nodes. This step converts the hierarchy of HOFs identified in step 2 into a 
hierarchy of variables (nodes). Thereafter, states are defined for the nodes to 
indicate various values the variables can take. For instance, a HOF can be 
converted to a variable with 2 states (“yes” and “no”). A 3-state variable (“high”, 
“medium” and “low”) is also possible depending on the required depth of the 
accident analysis. 
• Graphic. With a hierarchy of nodes and states defined, a BN representing the 
relationships among HOFs can be constructed. The relationships depicted in 
HFACS will be mapped onto a BN via its graphical representation with edge-
connecting nodes. In this step, the BN is systematically constructed according to 
the hierarchal structure of HFACS. 
Chapter 3: Quantitative Marine Accident Model Within HFACS 
37 
 
• Elicit. With the graphical structure of BN, this step is eliciting CPT for all the 
nodes. In the elicitation procedure, the relative priority weights are derived using 
fuzzy AHP. Fuzzy AHP is an extension of the traditional AHP methodology that 
incorporates fuzzy comparison ratios	ܿ̃௜௝. With such pair-wise comparisons, fuzzy 
AHP is effectively utilized to convert linguistic variables to probability values. 
For example, to determine the probability of one node at states	 ଵܵ,	ܵଶ, and	ܵଷ 
precise values need to be given for the conditional probabilities in AHP, which 
are more difficult for experts to estimate. Instead, in fuzzy AHP, it is easier to 
give linguistic evaluation scale of pair-wise comparisons by questions such as 
“comparing states	 ௜ܵ and	 ௝ܵ, which one is more probable to occur and how much 
more?” In addition, it is noted that as the number of parent nodes grows, the 
elicitation process may become complicated. In this work, the decomposition 
method that allows domain experts to elicit CPT by considering each parent node 
separately is applied to reduce this complexity. Details about using fuzzy AHP 
and decomposition method for CPT elicitation are elaborated in Section  3.1.2. 
• Reasoning. The last step of the model is BN inference from which safety 
intervention strategies can be derived. After all the CPTs are elicited, the 
quantitative analysis can be performed via Bayesian inference. The type of 
Bayesian inference depends on the specific goals of each accident analysis. For 
example, the probability of accident can be calculated if the prior probability of 
HOFs is known. The relative contribution of HOFs to the accident can also be 
investigated, which is indicated by the posterior conditional probability of each 
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node. Finally, with these quantitative results, safety intervention measures can be 
suggested to prevent the accident reoccurring. 
 
3.1.2. CPT elicitation by integrating fuzzy AHP with a decomposition method 
CPT elicitation has been known to be a complicated issue due to the large number of 
judgments required to fully quantify the relationships in the BN. For a binary node with 
n parents,	2௡ conditional probabilities are required. The lack of data related with HOFs 
prompts for CPT elicitation via expert judgments. However, expert’s judgments are 
subjected to biases (Fox and Clemen 2005), especially when encountering a large BN. 
The integration of AHP and a decomposition method can reduce subjective biases and 
help domain experts to elicit the CPT in an efficient manner (Chin et al. 2009). 
However, the conventional AHP may not be able to truly reflect human cognitive 
processes, especially for the situation when it is difficult for experts to estimate the 
precise values. In these cases, fuzzy AHP enables domain experts to avoid giving 
precise probability for the CPTs. Instead they give triangular fuzzy number to perform 
pair-wise comparisons of the states according to their relative occurrence probability 
(Haghighi et al. 2010). This section gives an illustration on how to integrate fuzzy AHP 
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• A node without parents: 
Suppose a node X has k states	( ଵܵ, ܵଶ, … , ܵ௞) without parents. To elicit prior 
probabilities for each state of X, it is required to determine		ݓ = [ݓଵ, ݓଶ, … ,ݓ௦, … ,ݓ௞], 
where ݓ௦ is the probability of X at state	ܵ௦. Traditionally, ݓ௦ is specified directly by 
experts, using their knowledge and experiences. When the number of states is small, 
such a method may be efficient. With the increase of states, simultaneously estimating 
probabilities of all the states inevitably involve inaccuracies. 
An alternative way is using triangular fuzzy number to perform pair-wise 
comparisons between states for generating their probabilities. Because there are only 
two instead of multiple states considered simultaneously in a pair-wise comparison, it 
should be much easier to provide fuzzy linguistic scale of comparison than the direct 
estimation of probabilities. Fuzzy AHP is also a useful tool for dealing with 
uncertainties (Paralikas and Lygeros 2005). The prior probability of each state can be 





൱ ( 3-1) 
where	ܿ̃௜௝ is a triangular fuzzy number to show the probability comparison of 	 ௜ܵ 
over	 ௝ܵ: 
ܿ̃௜௝ = (݈௜௝,݉௜௝, ݑ௜௝) ( 3-2) 
ܿ̃௜௝ is a fuzzy linguistic scale that is specified by asking domain experts questions 
like “comparing states ௜ܵ and	 ௝ܵ, which one is more likely to occur and how much 
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more?” Domain experts answer these questions using the fuzzy linguistic scale 
provided in Table  3.1 (Abdel-Kader and Dugdale 2001). 
If there is more than one expert, the following equation can be used to aggregate 




ଵ + ܿ̃௜௝ଶ + ⋯+ ܿ̃௜௝௡൯ ( 3-3) 
where n is the number of experts. 













൱ ( 3-4) 
 
Table  3.1. Fuzzy scale in AHP 
Linguistic scales Triangular fuzzy scale Triangular fuzzy reciprocal scale
Just equal (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1) 
Equally probable (1/2, 1, 3/2) (2/3, 1, 2) 
Weakly probable (1, 3/2, 2) (1/2, 2/3, 1) 
Strongly more probable (3/2, 2, 5/2) (2/5, 1/2, 2/3)  
Very strongly more probable (2, 5/2, 3) (1/3, 2/5, 1/2) 
Absolutely more probable (5/2, 3, 7/2) (2/7, 1/3, 2/5) 
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The value of fuzzy synthetic extent with respect to ݅th object is defined as (Celik 
and Cebi 2009): 
௜ܵ
= ቆ ∑ ݈௜௝
௡௝ୀଵ
∑ ݈௜௝௡௝ୀଵ + ∑ ∑ ݑ௞௝௡௝ୀଵ௡௞ୀଵ,௞ஷ௜ ,
∑ ݉௜௝௡௝ୀଵ
∑ ∑ ݉௞௝௡௝ୀଵ௡௞ୀଵ ,
∑ ݑ௜௝௡௝ୀଵ
∑ ݑ௜௝௡௝ୀଵ + ∑ ∑ ݈௞௝௡௝ୀଵ௡௞ୀଵ,௞ஷଵ ቇ 
( 3-5)
If A is a perfectly consistent comparison matrix, fuzzy weight vector can be 
precisely characterized by		ݓᇱ = ( ଵܵ, ܵଶ, … , ܵ௡)். Otherwise, the weight vectors of A 
can be derived through the solution of the following constrained nonlinear optimization 
model (Lee, Mogi et al. 2008): 





+ ൫݈݊ ݓ௜ெ − ݈݊ݓ௝ெ − ݈݊݉௜௝൯ଶ



























0 < ݓ௜௅ ≤ ݓ௜ெ ≤ ݓ௜௎.
 ( 3-7) 
 
The model is solved using GAMS program. The optimum solution to the above 
model forms normalized fuzzy weights: 
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ݓ = ൫ݓ௜௅, ݓ௜ெ, ݓ௜௎൯ ݅ = 1,2, … , ݊ ( 3-8) 
The fuzzy weight vector is a fuzzy number. Therefore, it is necessary to employ a 
non-fuzzy ranking method for fuzzy numbers to compare the states. In other words, the 
procedure of de-fuzzification should be done to locate the Best Non-fuzzy Performance 
(BNP) value. Such related common methods include mean of maximal, center of area 
(COA) and α-cut. Among these methods, utilizing COA method to find out BNP is 
simpler and more practical. Also, there is no need to bring in the preferences of any 
evaluators, so it is used in this study. The BNP value of the fuzzy number		ݓ௜ can be 
found by the following equation: 
ܤܰ ௪ܲ௜ =
ൣ൫ݓ௜௎ − ݓ௜௅൯ − (ݓ௜ெ − ݓ௜௅)൧
3 + ݓ௜
௅ ∀݅ = 1,… , ݊. ( 3-9) 
The normalized weight		ܤܰ ௪ܲ௜ is the prior probability of the ݅th state of node X. 
• A node with one parent: 
Suppose a node X has k states	( ଵܵ, ܵଶ, … , ܵ௞) and one parent T (with m 
states	ݐଵ, ݐଶ, … , ݐ௠). Let		ݓ௣ = ൣݓ௣ଵ, ݓ௣ଶ, … ,ݓ௣௞൧, where		ݓ௣௦ is the probability of X at 
state S given parent T at state		݌(݌ = 1,2, … ,݉	ܽ݊݀	ݏ = 1,2, … , ݇). When node T is at 
state	ݐ௣, the corresponding comparison matrix is shown in Table  3.2. After		ݓ௣௦ = (ܵ =




Chapter 3: Quantitative Marine Accident Model Within HFACS 
43 
 
Table  3.2. Corresponding comparison matrix of		ܲ൫ܺ = ܵ௦|ܶ = ݐ௣൯ 
T is at state p ଵܵ ܵଶ … ܵ௞ ݓ௣ 
ଵܵ  ܿ̃ଵଵ ܿ̃ଶଵ … ܿ̃ଵ௞ ݓ௣ଵ 
ܵଶ  ܿ̃ଶଵ ܿ̃ଶଶ … ܿ̃ଶ௞ ݓ௣ଶ 
⋮  ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
ܵ௞  ܿ̃௞ଵ ܿ̃௞ଶ … ܿ̃௞௞ ݓ௣௞ 
 
Since node T has m states, m pair-wise comparison matrices for each state of T 
should be constructed.  
For each matrix, the question “if node T is at state		ݐ௣, comparing states	 ௜ܵ and		 ௝ܵ 
of X, which one is more likely to occur?” will be evaluated to specify	ܿ̃௜௝. And then the 
m pair-wise comparisons can be solved individually just similar to the computation of 
prior probabilities for a node with no parents. All the m vectors		ݓ௣ (as shown in 
Table  3.3) will be calculated, which are the elements of the CPT for the node X with 
one parent T. 
Table  3.3. Conditional probability table for the node X with one parent T. 
        State of node T 
  ݐଵ ݐଶ … ݐ௠ 
State of node X 
ଵܵ ݓଵଵ ݓଶଵ … ݓ௠ଵ 
ܵଶ ݓଵଶ ݓଶଶ … ݓ௠ଶ 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮  
ܵ௞ ݓଵ௞ ݓଶ௞ … ݓ௠௞ 
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• A node with multiple parents: 
Suppose a node X has k states		( ଵܵ, ܵଶ, … , ܵ௞) and n parents		ܶ(ଵ), ܶ(ଶ), … , ܶ(௝),
… , ܶ(௡). The node		ܶ(௝) has the states of		ܶ(௝)ଵ, 	ܶ(௝)ଶ, … , ܶ(௝)௧ೕ	(	ݐ௝ is the state number 
of node		ܶ(௝); ݆ = 1,… , ݊). 
It will be difficult for experts to directly estimate the probability of each state of X 
conditional on the combination of the states of its parents, which is defined by the 
following equation: 
ܲ ቀܺ = ௜ܵ|ܶ(ଵ) = ௣ܶೕ(ଵ), ܶ(ଶ) = ௣ܶೕ(ଶ), … , ܶ(௡) = ௣ܶೕ(௡)ቁ 
(݅ = 1,2, … , ݇; ݌௝ = 1,2, … , ݐ௝; ݆ = 1,2, … , ݊)  
( 3-10) 
When a node A in a Bayesian Network has two parents B and C, its probability 
conditional on B and C can be approximated by: 
ܲ(ܣ|ܤ, ܥ) = ߙܲ(ܣ|ܤ)ܲ(ܣ|ܥ) ( 3-11) 
where ߙ is a normalizing constant to ensure that		∑ ܲ(ܽ|ܤ, ܥ)௔∈஺ = 1. 
According to Eq. ( 3-11), Eq. ( 3-10) can be simplified as: 
ܲ ቀܺ = ௜ܵ|ܶ(ଵ) = ௣ܶೕ(ଵ), ܶ(ଶ) = ௣ܶೕ(ଶ), … , ܶ(௡) = ௣ܶೕ(௡)ቁ




൫݅ = 1,2, … , ݇; ݌௝ = 1,2, … , ݐ௝; ݆ = 1,2, … , ݊൯  
( 3-12)
where	ߙ is a normalizing constant to ensure that: 
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෍ܲቀܺ = ௜ܵ|ܶ(ଵ) = ௣ܶೕ(ଵ), ܶ(ଶ) = ௣ܶೕ(ଶ), … , ܶ(௡) = ௣ܶೕ(௡)ቁ
௞
௜ୀଵ
= 1 ( 3-13) 
In cases for nodes with multiple parents as shown in Figure  3-2, the 
decomposition method greatly simplifies the CPT elicitation by allowing conditioning 







Figure  3-2. Decomposition method of conditional probability calculation 
 
3.1.3. Validation using sensitivity analysis 
When a new model is proposed, validation is required to ensure its soundness. This is 
especially important when subjective estimation is involved in the model (Yang et al. 
2008). There are several well-accepted validation methods available. In this thesis, a 
sensitivity analysis for partial validation of the proposed model is adopted. The 













ܶ(ଵ) ܶ(ଶ) … ܶ(௡)
ܺ ܺ ܺ ܺ 
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Axiom1. A slight increase/decrease in the prior subjective probabilities of each 
parent node should certainly result in the effect of a relative increase/decrease of the 
posterior probabilities of child nodes. 
Axiom2. Given the variation of subjective probability distributions of each parent 
node, its influence magnitude to child node values should keep consistent. 
Axiom3. The total influence magnitudes of the combination of the probability 
variations from x attributes on the values should be always greater than the one from 
the set of x–y (y ∈ x) attributes. 
 
3.2. Case study 1: Release of toxic vapors from a chemical tanker 
Jo Eik, a chemical tanker completed a ship-to-ship transfer at Vopak Terminal Tessiside 
on 6 May 2009 (Marine-accident-investigation-branch 2009). Following the end of 
ship-to-ship transfer, Jo Eik carried out mandatory pre-wash using portable washing 
equipment because the majority of the fixed washing systems were defective. The water 
supply hose of washing machine crossed through cargo tank inboard Butterworth hatch 
(an opening on the deck of a vessel opened when cleaning or ventilating the tanks), 
which remained open. As the cargo tank was washed, water mist containing cargo 
vapors escaped through the open hatch as the tank’s atmosphere was agitated. The 
vapors accumulated around the Butterworth hatch in which was an unidentified 
enclosed space. After the final pre-wash of the cargo tanks, a deck rating noticed a 
strong pungent smell before climbing down the ladder to shut off the power to the 
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pump, but he did not wear respiratory protection. The deck rating lost consciousness 
and slumped due to exposure to the toxic crude sulfate turpentine vapor, containing 
hydrogen sulfide. The chief officer, who attempted a rescue without wearing respiratory 
protection, lost his sense of smell and was unable to speak. Another deck rating who 
accompanied the chief officer suffered effects of vapor inhalation but managed to 
escape. 
 
3.2.1. Applying the proposed model 
1) Define the accident clearly 
After reviewing the accident report from marine accident investigation branch 
(MAIB), the accident is defined as “Inhalation of hazardous vapor by crew due to the 
discharge of poisonous cargo vapor.” 
2) Analyze with HFACS 
Working on the four-level hierarchy structure discussed earlier, level 1 “unsafe 
acts” identifies the HOFs which directly lead to the accident. Followed by level 2 
“preconditions for unsafe acts”, the purpose of level 2 is seeking out the conditions that 
result in the HOFs at level 1. The analysis process continues to level 3 “unsafe 
supervision” and ends at level 4 “organizational influences”, which identifies the 
fundamental causes of the accident. The list of HOFs generated from the first accident 
is shown in Table  3.4. 
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Table  3.4. Hierarchy of human and organizational errors in the first accident 
Nodes / Errors Descriptions States 
Level 0: Accidents 
Inhale hazardous 
vapor 
Inhalation of hazardous cargo vapor by crew while 
washing tank Yes, No 
Level 1: Unsafe Acts 
Open butter-
worth hatch  
Open P10 butter-worth hatch to let washer water hose 
passed through  
Yes, No 
No BA /wrong 
BA 
Not wear any breathing apparatus (BA) when go into 
hazardous atmosphere/ Check wearing an 
inappropriate BA 
Not locate 
sources of smell 




Not test the atmosphere before going into hazardous 
atmosphere 
Level 2: Preconditions For Unsafe Acts 
Unaware of 
cargo’s danger 




wash tank using portable washing equipment contrary 
to the vessel’s  P & A manual instructions 
Complacent 
attitude 






Identify wrongly or insufficiently the hazards of cargo 
and recommending the wrong or insufficient 
precautions 
Level 3: Unsafe Supervision 
Not check Failed to check fixed washing system defective High, 













Not provide the cargo specific MSDS /Used Wrong 
MSDS 
Yes, No 




There were no specific instructions on board for 
handling ܪଶܵ cargoes 
Failed to identify 
unsafe  
the dangers posed by the presence of ܪଶܵ were not 
identified 
Level 4: Organizational Influences 
Not enforcing 
safety standard 
Available guidance and procedures discipline are not 
followed strictly/ various documentation, including 






Locations where similar accidents might occur are not 
identified when planning drills. 
Insufficient 
check 
Not performing or insufficient checks. E.g. inspection 




Vopak Terminal did not provide guidance or set any 
limitations on open tank washing/ no specific 
instructions for handling cargoes  
Ignore mutual 
aid messages 





A further pre-arrival conference was not carried out 
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3) Nodes and states of the identified HOFs 
The HOFs identified in step 2 are converted to the nodes of BN. After that, states 
are defined for each node according to the real conditions and the required depth of 
accident analysis. The states of each node are shown in the third column of Table  3.4. 
4) Graphical representation with BN 
With the nodes defined, the BN of “Inhalation of hazardous vapor by crew due to 
the discharge of poisonous cargo vapor” is constructed as shown in Figure  3-3. 
5) Elicit CPT for the nodes of BN 
With the graphical structure of BN, this step requires the elicitation of CPT for the 
nodes. The experts we invited for elicitation process are a group of four experts. The 
first one is a full professor of Shanghai Jiaotong University, who is an expert of 
maritime safety. The second one is an experienced engineer of Great ship Global 
Offshore Service Company in Singapore. The third one is an associate professor of 
fuzzy reliability from Goa College of Engineering. The fourth one is an assistant 
professor of safety engineering from China University of Petroleum. Discussing the real 
conditions of the case study, they elicit the values for each pair-wise comparison 
matrix. After all the comparison matrixes are estimated, the CPTs are elicited by 
integrating fuzzy AHP with decomposition method as shown in Section  3.1.2. After all 
CPTs are assigned, the quantitative analysis can be performed using Bayesian inference. 
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Figure  3-3. Graphical representation of “inhale vapor” accident with prior probabilities 
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6) Inference with BN 
Given the occurrence of “Inhale vapor”, a backward inference can be performed 
to calculate the posterior probabilities of each node to identify the important HOFs. The 
posterior probabilities of the HOF nodes are shown in Figure  3-4.  
These posterior probabilities can be compared with their original prior 
probabilities to give an indication of the relative contribution of the HOFs. Such as, the 
HOF with the highest percentage change from prior to posterior probability indicates 
that it is sensitive to the occurrence of the accident. 
As an example, the calculation of CPT for the node “Not check equipment 
defective” is presented in this section. The conditional probability of node 
“Not_check_equipment_defective” are shown in Table  3.5, given the different states of 
node “Insufficient_check”. 




Figure  3-4. Posterior probabilities of the human factor given the first accident happened 




Table  3.5. Conditional probability of “Not-check-equipment-defective” given “Insufficient 
check” (high) 
Not-check-equipment-defective 
 ଵܵ  ܵଶ  ܵଷ  ܤܰܲݓ  
High 
 
(1, 1, 1) (2/3, 1, 2) (2/7, 1/3, 2/5) 0.324 
(1/2, 1, 3/2) (1, 1, 1) (1/7, 1/3, 3/5) 0.343 
(5/2, 3, 7/2)  (5/3, 3, 7) (1, 1, 1) 0.106 
Medium 
 
(1, 1, 1) (1, 3/2, 2) (2, 5/2, 3) 0.200 
(1/2, 2/3, 1) (1, 1, 1) (2, 5/2, 3) 0.207 
(1/3, 2/5, 1/2) (1/3, 3/5, 1) (1, 1, 1) 0.407 
Low 
(1, 1, 1) (1/2, 1, 3/2) (2, 5/2, 3) 0.233 
(2/3, 1, 2) (1, 1, 1) (4/3, 5/2, 6) 0.120 
(1, 1, 1) (1/2, 1, 3/2) (2, 5/2, 3) 0.470 
 
When the state of node “Insufficient_check” is high, the conditional probability of 
“Not_check_equipment_defective” is calculated according to Eq. ( 3-8). 	






Substitute ݓ into Eq. ( 3-9), we can get:	 
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ܤܰ ௪ܲ೔ = (0.324,0.343,0.106) 
Given the different states of node “Insufficient check”, the conditional probability of node “Not 
check equipment defective” are shown in Table  3.6. Integrating the above calculation method 
with the decomposition method, the conditional probabilities of node “Not check equipment 
defective” are shown in Table  3.7. 
 
Table  3.6. Conditional probability of “Not-check-equipment-defective” given different states of 
“Insufficient-check” 
Not-check-equipment-defective 
 ଵܵ  ܵଶ  ܵଷ  ݓ  
High 
 
(1,	1,	1)	 (1/2,	2/3,	1) (2/7,	1/3,	2/5)	 0.438
(1,	3/2,2)	 (1,	1,	1) (2/7,	1/2,	4/5)	 0.270
(5/2,	3,	7/2)		 (5/4,	2,	7/2) (1,	1,	1) 0.136
Medium 
 
(1,	1,	1)	 (1,	3/2,	2) (1,	1,	1) 0.263
(1/2,	2/3,	1)	 (1,	1,	1) (1/2, 2/3,	1)	 0.353
(1,	1,	1)	 (1,	3/2,	2) (1,	1,	1) 0.263
Low 
(1,	1,	1)	 (2/3,	1,	3) (2/7,	1/3,	2/5)	 0.274
(1/3,	1,3/	2)	 (1,	1,	1) (2/21, 1/3,	3/5)	 0.351
(5/2,	3,	7/2)	 (5/3,	3,	21/2) (1,	1,	1) 0.091
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Table  3.7. Conditional probability of “Not-check-equipment-defective” given “Insufficient-
check” and “Not-enforcing-safety-standard” 
Insufficient-check Not-enforcing-safety-standard High Medium Low 
High High 0.5706 0.3717 0.0577 
High Medium 0.3642 0.5168 0.1190 
High Low 0.4054 0.5504 0.0442 
Medium High 0.4414 0.2807 0.2779 
Medium Medium 0.2263 0.3136 0.4601 
Medium Low 0.3330 0.4414 0.2256 
Low High 0.5152 0.1629 0.3219 
Low Medium 0.2698 0.1859 0.5443 
Low Low 0.4289 0.2827 0.2884 
 
3.2.2. Sensitivity analysis and results 
Sensitivity analyses are conducted in this section to validate the proposed model. The 
importance degree of each HOF regarding to the node “Inhale vapor” can be assessed 
using entropy reduction (mutual information). Intuitively, mutual information measures 
the information that X and Y share: it measures how much knowing one of these 
variables reduces the uncertainty about the other. 
Chapter 3: Quantitative Marine Accident Model Within HFACS 
57 
 
Formally, the mutual information of two random variables X and Y can be defined 
as: 
ܪ(ܺ; ܻ) =෍ ෍ ݌(ݔ, ݕ)݈݋݃ଶ
݌(ݔ, ݕ)
݌(ݔ)ܲ(ݕ)௫∈௑௬∈௒  ( 3-14) 
where p(x, y) is the joint probability distribution function of X and Y, and p(x) and p(y) 
are the marginal probability distribution functions of X and Y, respectively. 
The prior probability, posterior probability and mutual information of each HOF 
are compared as shown in Table  3.8.  
 













Node of level 4: organizational influences 
Insufficient_check 70 70.4 0.571 0.000449 
Ineffective_emergency_drill 60 60.4 1.667 0.000403 
Not_enforcing_safety_standard 60 63.8 6.333 0.04462 
No_prearrival_conference 90 90.5 0.556 0.001423 
No_guidance_standard 50 50.9 1.800 0.002796 
Ignore_mutual_aid_messages 90 90.1 0.111 3.982e-005 
Node of level 3: unsafe supervision 
Not_check_equipment_defective 46.8 48.3 3.205 0.00739 
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Deficient_training 58.7 61.2 4.259 0.01919 
Inadequate_brief 88.5 90.4 2.147 0.01851 
Not_provide_specific_MSDS 91.9 94.5 2.829 0.0392 
Not_provide_instructions 69.3 73.9 6.638 0.0591 
Failed_to_identify_unsafe 90 90.3 0.333 0.00087 
Node of level 2: preconditions for unsafe acts 
Using_unsuitable_equipment 74.3 80 7.672 0.0933 
Complacent_attitude 80.0 84.7 5.875 0.0545 
Unaware_of_cargo_danger 94.1 96.5 2.550 0.0412 
Wrong_risk_assessment 74.4 78.1 4.973 0.0426 
Node of level 1: unsafe acts 
Open_butterworth_hatch 74.5 80.1 7.517 0.0941 
No_BA_wrong_BA 93.6 98.3 5.021 0.131 
Not_test_atmosphere 96.1 97.9 1.873 0.0339 
Not_locate_sources_of_smells 93.6 97.2 3.846 0.0815 
 
The posterior probability of the node “Not enforcing safety standard” has the 
larger increment than other nodes of level 4 given the accident occurrence. This 
suggests that the occurrence of the accident is likely due to not enforcing safety 
standard. In addition, “Not provide instructions”, “Not provide specific MSDS”, “Using 
unsuitable equipment”, “Complacent attitude”, “Open butter worth hatch”, “No BA 
wrong BA” and “Not locate sources of smells” also contribute significantly to the 
occurrence of the accident. 
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While the 5% step by step reduction of prior probability of each organizational 
node varies from 5% to 30%, the reduction rates of accident probability are computed, 
which are shown in Figure  3-5, from which, it can be seen that the probability of 
accident has the largest reduction when the prior probability of “Not enforcing safety 
standard” decreases the same as other factors. It highlights that “Not enforcing safety 
standard” is the most important organizational factor. 
 
 
Figure  3-5. Effect of change in prior probabilities of each organizational factor on the 
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With the BN inference mentioned earlier, the following recommendations of 
safety measures (corresponding to above major accident contributors) are given to avoid 
recurrence: 
• All crews should be enforced and eligible to strictly following the safety 
standards and requirements. Some example of the standards could be that safety 
precaution must be taken when crew is in some enclosed spaces. 
• The pre-arrival conference must be held before the loading/unloading operation 
and adequate brief should be provided. All the relevant information of cargo and 
related hazards and safety procedures should be covered at the pre-arrival 
conference. 
• A specific MSDS of cargoes should be provided, which need contain the 
comprehensive information to determine special procedures for ensuring the 
safety of the crew. 
• The defective equipment, such as the defective fixed washing system, should be 
repaired or renewed as soon as possible. 
• Operator must wear appropriate breathing apparatus when dealing with hazardous 
cargo. 
• The mutual aid messages should be immediately investigated to identify the risk 
avoiding complacent attitude. 
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• Detailed instruction should be provided for managing of unfamiliar cargoes and 
cargo operation. 
• It should be arranged for crews to carry out additional training in rescue 
operations to enlighten the crisis consciousness and the right contingency 
measures. 
• Cargo operations should be kept as “closed operations” to prevent vapours 
spilling and releasing. For this case, leaving the Butterworth hatches open directly 
causes the release of cargo vapours. 
• Comprehensive check covering all phases should be carried out to ensure the 
cargo operation is conducted safely. 
• The full briefing should be given to the chief officer after receiving the cargo 
stowage plan. Followed by the briefing, all items in the safety checklists in the 







Chapter 3: Quantitative Marine Accident Model Within HFACS 
62 
 
3.3. Case study 2: Vinyl chloride monomer eruption 
The gas carrier Coral Acropora was preparing to start to discharge her cargo into shore 
cargo tanks when there was an escape of Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM) (Yang, 
Bonsall et al. 2008). On arrival at the berth, a cargo surveyor had boarded the vessel 
and, after calculating the cargo quantity, he had asked the chief officer to run a cargo 
pump in each tank as he took cargo samples. The chief officer had not been aware of 
the need for sampling and he had not made preparations or planned for it. However, he 
acceded to the request without including the operation in the discharge plan. The chief 
officer opened the valves on the aft tank, which allowed recirculation of the cargo in 
that tank. He then started the aft tank cargo pump using local controls sited on the tank 
top. 
The cargo surveyor began filling his sample cylinder from the designated tank 
sampling point. After a few minutes, the cargo alarm klaxon sounded on deck. The 
chief officer walked around the tank dome and, using a local control, stopped the 
klaxon from sounding. He assumed the alarm indicated that the cargo pump had 
tripped, but he could not be certain without going to the cargo office. A few moments 
later, the klaxon sounded again. The chief officer then noticed a large cloud of white 
vapor advancing down the deck towards him. He quickly ran aft, taking hold of the 
cargo surveyor, hitting the emergency shutdown (ESD) button as he passed by. They 
managed to reach the shelter provided by the accommodation before the cloud overtook 
them. A little less than 600 kilograms of liquid and vapor VCM had erupted from the 
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vessel’s forward cargo tank mast riser after the forward tank had become over-
pressurized. 
 
3.3.1. Applying the proposed model 
After reviewing the accident report from MAIB, the accident is defined as “Eruption to 
form vapor cloud”. The 6 “DANGER” steps of the proposed model are carried out to 
analyze the critical HOFs of the second accident. The list of HOFs is shown in 
Table  3.9. With the nodes and states defined, the BN of “Eruption to form vapor cloud” 
is built in Figure  3-6. After all the CPTs are elicited by integrating fuzzy AHP with 
decomposition method, the quantitative analysis can be performed using Bayesian 
inference. The posterior probabilities of the HOF nodes are shown in Figure  3-7. 
 
Table  3.9. Hierarchy of HOFs in the second accident case 
Nodes / Errors Descriptions States 




Vinyl Chloride Monomer had erupted to form a large 
cloud of white vapor cloud. Yes, No 
Level 1: Unsafe Acts 
Override safety 
feature 
It was common to use override switch during operations. 
Yes, No 
Not wear PPE Personnel did not wear proper personal protective 
equipment. 
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No closed loop 
sampling 
The cargo survey not used “closed loop sampling”. 
No double valve 
segregation 




Not manning cargo office led to alarms not being 
positively and immediately identified. 
Not stop pump 
promptly 
The chief officer did not stop the cargo pump when he 
became aware of the first deck cargo alarm. 
Level 2: Preconditions For Unsafe Acts 
Poor liaison A poor liaison between vessel’s staff and those on the 




Low Not uncover 
deficiencies 
Gas carrier inspections and vetting did not uncover the 
ship or shore deficiencies in the operational procedures. 





Chief officer could not plan ahead and not prepared. 
Insufficient 
sample point 
The aft dome of the vessel’s after tank is not equipped 




Checklists were not completed prior to the operation 
starting. 
Level 3: Unsafe Supervision 
No vetting 
inspection 







The shore emergency response was initially hampered 
by a lack of information from the vessel 
Yes, No 





The owner’s inspection program was not effective in 
uncovering and halting poor operational practices. 
Not maintain 
oversight 
No-one maintaining an oversight of the cargo operations 
No forewarned 
cargo sampling 
The chief officer did not have prior warning that cargo 




The cargo office was not manned during the critical 
stages of cargo operations 
Level 4: Organizational Influences 
Not enforcing 
safety standard 
The safe system existed on paper in the vessel’s safety 






The chief officer’s decision not to go to the cargo office 
to determine what had caused the alarm indicated an 
inappropriate level of safety awareness. 
External muster 
point 








The vessel had no means of direct communication with 
the terminal  
No experienced 
staff 
Neither EVC nor Agility employed experienced 
permanent staff to call on to undertake such inspections 
Inexperienced 
chief officer 
Newly promoted and relatively inexperienced masters 
and chief officers sail together. 




Figure  3-6. Graphical representation of the second accident with prior probabilities 




Figure  3-7. Posterior probabilities of the human factor given the second accident happened
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3.3.2. Sensitivity analysis and results 
Sensitivity analyses are conducted to validate the proposed model. The importance 
degree of HOFs regarding to the node “Eruption to form vapor cloud” can be assessed 
using entropy reduction (mutual information). The prior probability, posterior 
probability and mutual information of each HOF are compared as shown in Table  3.10.  
 













Node of level 4: organizational influences 
No_experienced_staff 90 90.3 0.333 2.003e-005 
Not_enforcing_safety_standard 80 80.8 1 0.0001506 
No_communication_means 90 90.2 0.222 6.779e-005 
Inexperienced_chief_officer 70 70.1 0.143 2.206e-005 
Inappropriate_safety_awareness 60 60.4 0.667 1.726e-005 
No_cargo_control_room 95 95 0 2.878e-007 
Node of level 3: unsafe supervision 
No_vetting_inspection 88.3 89.3 1.133 0.000379 
Ineffective_inspection 80.6 82 1.737 0.000223 
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Lack_information 85 85.7 0.824 0.000186 
Not_maintain_oversight 83 83.5 0.602 2.376e-005 
No_forewarned_cargo_sampling 85.4 85.9 0.586 0.0006016 
Not_manned_cargo_office 81.7 82 0.367 7.37e-005 
Node of level 2: preconditions for unsafe acts 
Overload 89 90.1 1.236 0.000507 
Poor_liaison 83.5 85.4 2.275 9.378e-005 
Not_uncover_deficiencies 83.6 87.9 5.144 0.00268 
No_preparation_work 82.3 82.8 0.608 0.00218 
Insufficient_sample_point 85.6 85.7 0.117 0.000332 
No_preoperational_check 84.7 86 1.535 0.00172 
Node of level 1: unsafe acts 
Override_safety_feature 85.2 89.5 5.047 0.00864 
Not_wear_PPE 74.8 89.4 19.52 7.771e-005 
No_closed_loop_sampling 82.2 82.6 0.487 0.00258 
No_double_valve_segregation 82.6 90.3 9.322 0.0139 
Slow_response_to_alarm 74.9 76.8 2.537 0.013 
Not_stop_pump_promptly 84.9 85.2 0.353 0.00901 
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As can be seen, the posterior probability of “Not enforcing safety standard” 
among the nodes of level 4 increase most largely given the accident occurrence. It 
highlights the need of enforcing all crews to strictly follow safety standard.  
Among the nodes of level 3, the posterior probability of the node “No forewarned 
cargo sampling” has the largest increment given the accident occurs. This suggests that 
the occurrence of the accident is likely due to not providing prior warning of cargo 
sampling.  
Among the nodes of level 2, the posterior probability of the node “Not uncover 
deficiencies” and “No preparation work” have the largest increment when the accident 
occurs. It suggests “Not uncover deficiencies” and “No preparation work” contribute 
significantly to the occurrence of the accident. The posterior probability of the node 
“No double valve segregation” and “Slow response to alarm” have the larger increase 
among the nodes of level 1. It highlights the need of maintaining double valve 
segregation and immediate responding to alarm. 
While the 5% step by step reduction of prior probability of each organizational 
node varies from 5% to 30%, the reduction rates of accident probability are calculated 
as shown in Figure  3-8. It can be seen that the probability of accident has the largest 
reduction when the prior probability of “Not enforcing safety standard” decreases the 
same as other factors. It again highlights that “Not enforcing safety standard” is the 
most important HOF. Thus, the probability of “Eruption to form vapor cloud” accidents 
would drastically be reduced by enforcing safety standard.  
 




Figure  3-8. Effect of change in prior probabilities of each organizational factor on the 
probabilities of the second accident 
 
By sensitivity analysis, we can see that the model satisfies the three axioms 
presented in Section  3.1.3, which allows us to conclude that the inference made earlier 
is reliable. From above BN inference, important safety measures corresponding to the 
major accident contributors can be derived to prevent the similar accidents from 
recurring: 
• All crews should strictly follow the safety standards and put the safety 
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• Have the vessel advised about cargo sampling prior to arrival and the chief office 
should prepare well. 
• The charterer should make vetting inspections and employ permanent staff with 
marine gas carrier experience to call on to undertake such inspections. 
• When a tanker arrives alongside a terminal, she should do a lot of preparation 
work before loading or discharging cargo. The ship owner’s operating instructions 
must be carefully written to avoid putting undue pressure on crews. 
• Maintain double valves segregation system to avoid cargo transfer from one tank 
to the other as long as one of the 98% alarm and shutdown system is placed in 
override position. 
• The chief officer should take immediate steps to stop the operation when the 
cargo alarm sound and ascertain the true nature of the alarm. 
• Avoid overriding the 98% alarm/shutdown system by limit full cargo allowance. 
• The ship shore checklist should be completed by the loading master and the chief 
officer prior to cargo operations. 
• All personnel involved must wear appropriate protective equipment in case there 
is a risk from toxic gas or a liquid spill is present on deck. 
• Evaluate the performance of the chief officer and establish further actions to 
monitor performance and/training needs. 
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• Means for (emergency) communication between the vessel and the terminal is 
established as first priority and emergency contact numbers are available before 
commencing any cargo operations including cargo sampling. 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
From the application of the model to the two case studies, it can be concluded that the 
model is useful in investigating HOFs for the derivation of safety interventions. And, in 
general, “Not enforcing safety standard” contribute mostly to the accident occurrence. 
The application of HFACS allows a complete identification of HOFs, both active 
and latent, that are leading causes of accidents. The hierarchal structure of HFACS 
encourages investigators to seek out latent HOFs, which are often neglected in accident 
investigations. The model enables a quantitative assessment by using BN. BN enhances 
the ability of HFACS by allowing investigators or experts to quantify the degree of 
relationships among the HOFs. Fuzzy AHP is used to reduce the subjective biases by 
avoiding the need of defining exact probability for the nodes’ states. The decomposition 
method that is applied in CPT elicitation reduces the complexity by allowing 





CHAPTER 4: RISK AND COST OPTIMIZATION IN 
MARINE HAZARDOUS MATERIAL 
TRANSPORTATION 
 
Accident risk minimization in transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat) has been 
an active area of study with remarkable improvements in route selection domains. In 
this chapter, a bi-objective optimization model (including accident risk and cost) is 
proposed for transportation of hazardous materials in different routes (waterways). It is 
intended to determine the number of ships for transmitting hazmat or regular freight 
from origins to destinations in different itineraries. The expected risk evaluated in this 
problem is based on the expected area exposed by hazmat containers during 
transportation in the routes. The optimization model and the solution framework are 
used to solve a numerical but realistic problem instance. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section  4.1, a descriptive definition, 
essential assumptions, and the proposed optimization formulated problem are provided. 
In Section  4.2, a numerical example with a solution methodology is described in details 
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4.1. Problem description 
Transportation of hazardous materials is always risky and vulnerable to many types of 
accidents. It has a potentially negative impact on the marine environment (risk) and 
economic disadvantages (cost) (Chang et al. 2010). In regard of this risk and cost, a 
marine hazmat transportation problem is proposed and mathematically formulated in 
this section. Also, the assumptions of the problem are described. Our problem is to find 
out the best transportation plan (number of containers to be transported between nodes) 
for both hazardous and regular freights in a marine port network. There is a pre-
specified delivery time that must be satisfied in transportation between the supplier 
storage nodes and customer storage nodes. In general, the objectives are to minimize the 
total cost of transportation and the total accident risk associated with hazmat.  
There are two assumptions in the modeling: 
• Each type of container ship being used in shipment of hazmat or regular freights 
refers to the specific path between origin and destination terminals. With this 
assumption, the estimated exposed area of hazmats is related to the number of 
container ships of different types transporting between origin and destination 
terminals.  
• There is no traffic and waiting time at the terminals by assuming that the delivery 
system in the network is time-reliable. 
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The network schematic is shown in Figure  4-1. It includes supplier storage nodes 
(a), origin terminals (o), destination terminals (d), customer storage nodes (b), and the 













ܣ  Set of supplier storages, indexed by ܽ. 
ܱ  Set of origin terminals, indexed by ݋. 
ܦ   Set of destination terminals, indexed by ݀. 
ܤ  Set of customer storages, indexed by ܾ. 
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terminals	݋ ∈ ܱ, indexed by ݈. 
ܮௗ௕  Set of links between each destination terminal ݀ ∈ ܦ and each customer 
storage	ܾ ∈ ܤ, indexed by ݈ᇱ. 
௢ܸௗ  Set of ship types shipped between each terminal pair	݋ − ݀, where ݋ ∈ ܱ 
and	݀ ∈ ܦ, indexed by ݒ. 
Variables  
௟ܺ  Number of hazmat containers using link ݈. 
തܺ௟  Number of regular containers using link ݈. 
ܺ௡௩		 Number of hazmat containers in the nth ship of type ݒ.
തܺ௩		 Number of regular containers in ship of type ݒ.
ܺ௟ᇲ		 Number of hazmat containers using link ݈ᇱ.
തܺ௟ᇲ 		 Number of regular containers using link ݈ᇱ.
Indicator Variables 
௟ܻ = ൜1,											݂݅ ௟ܺ > 0	݋ݎ	 തܺ௟ > 00															 																						݋. ݓ.
௩ܻ = ൜1,										݂݅ ܺ௡௩ > 0	݋ݎ	 തܺ௩ > 00													 																							݋. ݓ.
ܻ௟ᇲ = ൜1,									݂݅ ܺ௟ᇲ > 0	݋ݎ	 തܺ௟ᇲ > 00													 																							 ݋. ݓ.




M             A large positive integer 
ܴ௟  Exposure risk due to moving one hazmat container in link	݈. 
ܴ௩  Exposure risk due to moving one hazmat container by ship of type	ݒ. 
ܴ௟ᇲ  Exposure risk due to moving one hazmat container in link	݈ᇱ. 
ܥ௟  Cost of moving one hazmat container in link ݈. 
̅ܥ௟  Cost of moving one regular container in link ݈. 
ܥ௩  Cost of moving one hazmat container using ship of type	ݒ. 
̅ܥ௩  Cost of moving one regular container using ship of type	ݒ. 
ܥ௟ᇲ  Cost of moving one hazmat container in link ݈ᇱ. 
̅ܥ௟ᇲ  Cost of moving one regular container in link ݈ᇱ.  
ܦ݁  Number of hazmat containers demanded.  
ܦ݁തതതത  Number of regular containers demanded. 
௩ܰ  Number of container ships of type ݒ. 
ܷ௩  Maximum number of containers that can be loaded in the ship of type	ݒ. 
ܦݐ  Delivery time of the network. 
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ݐ௟  Transportation time in link ݈. 
ݐ௩  Transportation time using ship of type ݒ. 
ݐ௟ᇲ  Transportation time in link ݈ᇱ. 
 
The problem is a bi-objective optimization model as presented in Eq. ( 4-1) and 
( 4-2). The risk objective represents water area exposure due to hazmat release from an 
accident. It should be remarked that the risk of exposure depends on the types of ships 
and the number of hazmat containers. The cost objective function contains the cost of 
transportation of hazmat and regular containers from origin terminals to destination 
terminals, the cost of shipment from supplier storages to origin terminals, and from 
destination terminals to the customer storages. Constraint ( 4-3) represents the balanced 
transshipment equation of hazmat and regular containers between different terminals. 
Constraint ( 4-4) guarantees that each customer’s hazmat and regular freight demands 
are satisfied. In constraint ( 4-5), the number of ships of a specific type is determined by 
the total number of containers to be shipped between two consecutive terminals. 
Constraint ( 4-6) ensures the balance in delivery time. Constraint ( 4-7) expresses the 
activation of indicator variables relating to the links. At the end, constraint ( 4-8) 
represents that all variables should be positive integer numbers and constraint ( 4-9) 
shows the sign restriction for indicator variables.  
 
 










 ( 4-1) 
Transportation cost: 
෍ (ܥ௟ ௟ܺ + ̅ܥ௟ തܺ௟)
௟∈௅ೌ೚









∑ ௟ܺ௟∈௅ೌ೚ = ∑ ∑ ܺ௡௩௩∈௏೚೏௡∈ேೡ ∀݋ ∈ ܱ  
∑ തܺ௟௟∈௅ೌ೚ = ∑ തܺ௩௩∈௏೚೏ 																							∀݋ ∈ ܱ       
∑ ∑ ܺ௡௩௩∈௏೚೏௡∈ேೡ = ∑ ܺ௟ᇲ௟ᇲ∈௅೏್ 						∀݀ ∈ ܦ  













+ തܺ௩ ≤ ܷ௩ ௩ܰ ∀ݒ ∈ ௢ܸௗ ( 4-5) 
  
ݐ௟ ௟ܻ + ݐ௩ ௩ܻ + ݐ௟ᇲܻ௟ᇲ ≤ ܦݐ									 ∀݈ ∈ ܮ௔௢, ∀ݒ ∈ ௢ܸௗ, ∀݈ᇱ ∈ ܮௗ௕ ( 4-6) 




ܯ ௟ܻ ≥ ௟ܺ	݋ݎ	 തܺ௟																	 ∀݈ ∈ ܮ௔௢  
ܯ ௩ܻ ≥ ܺ௡௩ ݋ݎ	 തܺ௩													 ∀݊ ∈ ௩ܰ, ∀ݒ ∈ ௢ܸௗ    





௟ܺ 	≥ 0, തܺ௟ ≥ 0				݅݊ݐ݁݃݁ݎ ∀݈ ∈ ܮ௔௢  
ܺ௟ᇲ ≥ 0, തܺ௟ᇲ ≥ 0		݅݊ݐ݁݃݁ݎ																∀݈ᇱ ∈ ܮௗ௕            




௟ܻ ∈ {0,1} 																							 ∀݈ ∈ ܮ௔௢  
௩ܻ ∈ {0,1}																																														∀ݒ ∈ ௢ܸௗ                    




For the risk estimation of water exposure by hazmat accidents, the equation 
presented by Evans et al. (2002) is extended to our case of study regarding to the links 
of hazmat containers shipments by different types of ships. Moreover, for each of the 
links between terminals, it is assumed only one type of ship can move. Assuming that 
the hazmat release makes water pollution, the area exposure risk in different links can 
be formulated as: 
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ܴ௟ = 	 ൬ܤݎ × ߩ௟ × ܣݎ௟
ଵ ଶൗ ൰ (ݑ௟ × ܪ௟)ൗ ∀݈ ∈ ܮ௔௢  
ܴ௩ = 	 ൬ܤݎ × ߩ௩ × ܣݎ௩
ଵ ଶൗ ൰ (ݑ௩ × ܪ௩)ൗ 																∀ݒ ∈ ௢ܸௗ           
ܴ௟ᇲ = 	 ൬ܤݎ × ߩ௟ᇲ × ܣݎ௟ᇲ
ଵ ଶൗ ൰ (ݑ௟ᇲ × ܪ௟ᇲ)ൗ 														∀݈ᇱ ∈ ܮௗ௕  
 
( 4-10) 
where		ܤݎ is the nominal breathing (respiration) rate of the marine ecosystems mostly 
fish,	ߩ is the population density of the marine ecosystem,	ݑ is the average velocity of 
water waves, and if we consider the waterways’ area as a box,	ܣݎ is the square base of 
area and	ܪ is the average height of the box (sea depth). 
 
4.2. Numerical example 
4.2.1. Case and optimization description 
A simple marine hazmat transportation network as in Figure  4-2 is considered. There 
are two big tankers to keep and storage hazmats in both supplier and customer nodes. 
Two origin terminal ports and destination terminal ports are existed in between. The 
waterways between storages and terminals are depicted that four types of container 
ships may transfer the freights between terminal ports (two for the regular freight and 
two for the hazmat). Also, for each type of container ship, two ships are available. The 
customer demands totally 7 hazmat containers and 7 regular containers. Between the 
terminals, maximum numbers of containers that can be loaded in a ship of type one and 
two are 5 and 4 units, respectively. The delivery time for the customer is considered as 
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48 hours. The expected costs and estimated risks for the different routes of the network 





Figure  4-2. A hazmat and regular containers’ transportation chain 
 
Table  4.1. Cost, risk and transport times of hazmat containers for the network depicted in 
Figure  4-2   
Hazmat container transportation Cost Risk Time 
From supplier storage 1 to origin terminal 1 7.4 1.5 2.8 
From supplier storage 1 to origin terminal 2 7.5 1.6 3 
From supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 1 6.9 1.7 2.5 
From supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 2 8 1.4 3.1 
Transportation between terminals by ship type 1 6 1.7 41 
Transportation between terminals by ship type 2 5.7 1.9 38 
From destination terminal 1 to customer storage 1 8.5 2.8 4.8 
From destination terminal 1 to customer storage 2 8.3 2.6 4.2 
From destination terminal 2 to customer storage 1 7.9 2.9 4.5 













Table  4.2. Cost, risk and transport times of regular containers for the network depicted in 
Figure  4-2   
Regular container transportation Cost Risk Time 
From supplier storage 1 to origin terminal 1 2.8 - 2.8 
From supplier storage 1 to origin terminal 2 3 - 3 
From supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 1 2.5 - 2.5 
From supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 2 2.7 - 3.1 
Transportation between terminals by ship type 1 3.3 - 41 
Transportation between terminals by ship type 2 3.5 - 38 
From destination terminal 1 to customer storage 1 4.3 - 4.8 
From destination terminal 1 to customer storage 2 4.1 - 4.2 
From destination terminal 2 to customer storage 1 3.9 - 4.5 
From destination terminal 2 to customer storage 2 4 - 4.9 
 
A simple solution approach is to reforming the problem as a binary integer 
program. The converted problem is solved by using “bintprog” algorithm in the 
optimization toolbox of Matlab R2012a software. “bintprog” uses a linear programming 
(LP)-based branch-and-bound algorithm to solve binary integer programming problems. 
The algorithm creates a search tree by repeatedly adding constraints (branches) to the 
problem. Each constraint leads to a node which can be zero or one. At each node, the 
algorithm solves an LP-relaxation problem. The binary integer requirement on the 
variables of the problem is replaced by the weaker constraint 0 ≤ (variable value) ≤ 1. 
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 ( 4-11) 
where f, b, ܾ௘௤, and Z are vectors, and A and ܣ௘௤are matrices. 
The algorithm faces to three possibilities for LP-relaxation problem: 
• Infeasible at the node: the algorithm removes the node from the tree, and it does 
not search any branch behind that node. 
• A new feasible integer point with lower objective value than previous nodes: the 
algorithm updates the best integer point and moves to the next node. 
• The LP-relaxation problem is optimal at the node but not integer and the optimal 
objective value of the LP relaxation problem is less than the best integer point: the 
algorithm branches to new nodes behind this node.  
The integer variables of the problem (X) are converted to binary integer variables 
(Z) by using below equation: 
ܺ = ܼ଴ + 2ܼଵ + 2ଶܼଶ …+ 2௞ܼ௞ ( 4-12) 
where k is the biggest integer number such that:   
൜2௞ ≤ ܦ݁ < 2(௞ାଵ)2௞ ≤ ܦ݁തതതത < 2(௞ାଵ)
						 ݂݋ݎ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ ௟ܺ, ܺ௡௩, ܽ݊݀ ܺ௟ᇲ	
		 ݂݋ݎ ݒܽݎܾ݈݅ܽ݁ݏ തܺ௟, തܺ௩, ܽ݊݀ തܺ௟ᇲ  ( 4-13) 
       




In the proposed optimization model, both the two linear objective functions should be 
minimized. Therefore, these two functions are combined together as one objective 
function. The combination is by normalizing the coefficients of the variables and 
making the summation of the normalized coefficients associated with each of the 
variables. Table  4.3 and Table  4.4 present the optimal results using bintprog solver.  
 
Table  4.3. Optimums for the shipment of hazmat containers in routes of the network depicted in 
Figure  4-2 
Hazmat container transportation 
Optimal number of 
containers 
From supplier storage 1 to origin terminal 1 0 
From supplier storage 1 to origin terminal 2 0 
From supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 1 7 
From supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 2 0 
Transportation between terminals by the 1st ship of type 1 5 
Transportation between terminals by the 2nd ship of type 1 2 
Transportation between terminals by the 1st ship of type 2 0 
Transportation between terminals by the 2nd ship of type 2 0 
From destination terminal 1 to customer storage 1 0 
From destination terminal 1 to customer storage 2 7 
From destination terminal 2 to customer storage 1 0 
From destination terminal 2 to customer storage 2 0 




Table  4.4. Optimums for the shipment of regular containers in routes of the network depicted in 
Figure  4-2 
Regular container transportation 
Optimal number of 
containers 
From supplier storage 1 to origin terminal 1 0 
From supplier storage 1 to origin terminal 2 0 
From supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 1 1 
From supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 2 6 
Transportation between terminals by the 1st ship of type 1 1 
Transportation between terminals by the 2nd ship of type 1 0 
Transportation between terminals by the 1st ship of type 2 4 
Transportation between terminals by the 2nd ship of type 2 2 
From destination terminal 1 to customer storage 1 0 
From destination terminal 1 to customer storage 2 1 
From destination terminal 2 to customer storage 1 6 
From destination terminal 2 to customer storage 2 0 
 
From the results, the supplier should transfer all the demanded hazmat containers 
from supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 1. Then, by the first ship of type 1 which is 
located at origin terminal 1, 5 containers should be transported to destination terminal 1 
and the remained 2 containers should be transported by the second ship of type 1. Later, 
all the hazmat containers should be shipped to customer storage 2. 
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For regular containers, the supplier should transfer one of the demanded 
containers from supplier storage 2 to origin terminal 1 and the rest to terminal 2. Then, 
by the first ship of type 1 which is located at origin terminal 1, one container should be 
transported to destination terminal 1, and from there it should be transported to 
customer storage 2. In the first ship of type 2, 4 containers should be loaded to fill the 
ship capacity and in the second ship of type 2, the rest 2 containers. Both ships of type 2 
transport to the destination terminal 2 and then, they transport to customer storage 1. 
The incorporation of multiple port terminals in this example enables us to show 
that emphasizing one objective over the other determines traffic-throughput at different 
terminals and number of containers in various intermodal ships in the network. 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, a risk-based optimization model was proposed to plan the ship 
capacities during transportation from supplier storages to customer storages. The 
optimal number of containers with different freights (hazmat and regular) was found by 
solving a bi-objective integer programming problem. We took advantage of the 
“bintprog” algorithm which is designed in Matlab R2012a software. The bi-objective 
integer programming problem was converted to the single objective binary 
programming problem to be compatible with “bintprog” algorithm requirements. The 
optimal numbers of containers in different routes were searched and resulted by the 




CHAPTER 5: ACCIDENT RISK MODELING OF 
MARINE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 
 
Accurate analysis of the reliability of maritime transportation systems is critical for 
decision making, especially when associated with unexpected risk of accidents. In this 
chapter, a novel approach for reliability and risk analysis of such systems is proposed 
through homogenous continuous time Markov chain modeling, for which the parameter 
estimation method is given. It is shown that the transition rates of Markov chains can be 
estimated from yearly observed data with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
simulation. Using risk analysis results, the reliability of the system can be computed as 
the probability of the event that the system works without any accident occurring. 
Many studies in maritime accident risk modelling are rooted in summary statistics 
such as expected value of accident frequency over time (Roberts and Marlow 2002; 
Darbra and Casal 2004; Korczewski 2008; Fabiano et al. 2010). Risk has a probabilistic 
essence which is conditioned on many negative outcomes of the system in different 
times. Therefore, straightforward statistics, such as a single accident rate value, are not 
sufficient enough to explain and predict accident risk over time. The add value of our 
model to the current studied models is in updating estimated accident risks by updating 
marine occurrence conditional probabilities. 
The chapter is organized as follows. A general approach is presented in 
Section  5.1. The approach includes Markov modeling for three states of marine systems 
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and MCMC simulation for risk assessment. Later, two case studies are shown in this 
chapter. In Section  5.2, for Australian commercial vessels, the accident risk model is 
presented with sensitivity analyses on model’s time span and initial transition rates. In 
Section  5.3, for vessels moving within Hong Kong waters, the proposed accident risk 
model is applied with sensitivity analysis on initial transition value. At the end of this 
chapter, conclusions are drawn in Section  5.4. 
 
5.1. General modeling approach 
Probabilistic risk assessment models should be improved dynamically due to the 
dynamic changes in safety levels of maritime transportation systems. On the other hand, 
simplicity and flexibility of the model are important. With this purpose, the general 
structure of the proposed accident risk model is presented in Figure  5-1.  
The depicted structure includes a three-state Markov modeling, MCMC 
simulation algorithm, and sensitivity analysis, respectively. Following the steps, marine 
accident risk can be estimated from the mathematical relations between occurrence rates 
and occurrence probabilities of Markov model. MCMC simulation is Monte Carlo 
simulation using Markov chain. In Markov chain, the probability of obtaining a value 
for a sample is dependent only on the previous sample. In this way, it can be paired 
with Bayesian updating to develop new probability density function for Markov 
occurrences.  
 













Figure  5-1. Structure of the proposed accident risk model 
 
5.1.1. Markov model 
In our Markov model, a three-state graph is drawn which can show accident 
occurrences for any type of marine transportation systems (see Figure  5-2). It is clear 
that state 3 (S3) means the full risky situation. Entering to this state is by two types of 
occurrences: 
 
1. Markov Modeling 
2.  MCMC Simulation 
Slice sampling algorithm 
Simulation Inputs 
1. Prior distribution of 
occurrence rates 
2.  Likelihood functions of 
Markov occurrences 
Estimation of Markov 
occurrence rates 
Risk estimations 




• On model’s time span 
• On initial Markov transition 
rates 









Figure  5-2. Markov accident model (ߣ௞௟: occurrence rate from state k to state l) 
 
1) Some marine incidents such as machinery failures, which were non-significant at 
first stages, become serious by time and cause the transition from state 2 to 3.  
2) Without any history and background, some serious accidents occur including 
death, serious injuries and damages. They cause the transition from state 1 to 3. 
In Markov model, each occurrence between states is characterized by an 
occurrence rate		ߣ௞௟. k and l are the indices for the start and end states, respectively 
(Modarres 2006). It is assumed that the occurrence probability in state k at time t, ݌௞(ݐ), 
is differentiable. Then, we can write the Kolmogorov’s forward equations for Markov 
model. For the numerical examples of this chapter, the below set of differential 
equations is solved and the time dependent probabilities of states are calculated. 
ௗ௣೔(௧)
ௗ௧ = −൫∑ ߣ௜௝(ݐ)௝ ൯ ∙ ݌௜(ݐ) + ∑ ቀߣ௜௝(ݐ) ∙ ݌௝(ݐ)ቁ௝   ( 5-1) 
S1: Safety 
λ13 λ12 
S3: Marine Accident  
λ23 
S2: Marine Incident 
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In the Markov diagram, it is shown that serious incidents may occur after and in 
continue of marine incidents. Sometimes, the exact time of a serious incident is 
unknown, because the system is not controlled and observed continuously. However, 
we can distinguish incidents and serious incidents after a period of time. Therefore, we 
consider a time span that starts from S1 state and ends with S3. We count the 
occurrences in this time span indifferent that which route is taken from S1 to S3 
through the Markov model. We call this partially observation. In this way, partial data 
are collectable from marine statistical reports. 
The first step in the reliability assessment of a system is to know the history of 
failures and accidents observed for the kind of system of concern. The data collected on 
the number of failures and accidents of the system is the prior knowledge of the system. 
From this step, through identifying the most frequent type of accidents, we can know 
about the main states of the Markov model. If the frequency of one type of accident is 
high or considerable, then the related data of that accident should be recorded. From the 
collected data, prior distributions for failure and accident rates of the system are 
estimated. These distributions are required to initiate the simulation algorithms.  
 
5.1.2. MCMC simulation 
To start MCMC simulation, we need to consider two distributions in advance. The first 
distribution is the prior distribution of unknown occurrence rates. The prior 
distribution,	ߨ଴(ߣ), refers to the initial belief of occurrence rate’s values	(ߣ) to be true. 
It is typically an estimate of the distribution for the continuous parameter		ߣ. Although 
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the choice of a prior or determination of prior distribution is often subjective, a rational 
agreement can be achieved by analyzing historical data from the same or other similar 
databases (Thodi et al. 2010). The second distribution is the likelihood function of 
occurrences. The likelihood function,	݂(ݎ|ߣ), is the prior distribution of observations 
(ݎ) conditioned by assumed values for occurrence rates (ߣ). 
In MCMC simulation, Bayes’ theorem states how to update the prior probability 
distribution of occurrence rates,	ߨ଴(ߣ), with a likelihood function,	݂(ݎ|ߣ), to obtain the 
posterior distribution of occurrence rates. Commonly written formula for Bayesian 
updating is: 
ߨ(ߣ|ݎ) = ݂(ݎ|ߣ). ߨ଴(ߣ)݂(ݎ) ∝ ݂(ݎ|ߣ). ߨ଴(ߣ) ( 5-2) 
In this formula, the samples for posterior distribution of occurrence rates,	ߨ(ߣ|ݎ), 
will be generated by combining the prior distribution with observed data. The posterior 
density,	ߨ(ߣ|ݎ)	summarizes the total information, after viewing the initial data of 
occurrences, and provides a basis for inference regarding the parameter	ߣ (vector of 
occurrence rates). 
With this background on MCMC simulation, the procedure of slice sampling 
algorithm is as follows: 
1) Assume initial values for occurrences rates ߣ଴ within the domain of posterior 
distribution	ߨ(ߣ|ݎ)	which is estimated by the multiplication of likelihood function 
and prior distribution from Eq. ( 5-2). 
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2) Draw a real value for occurrence rates		ߣ∗		uniformly between 0 
and		ߣ଴		(i.e.		[0, ߨ(ߣ଴|ݎ)]). In this way, the horizontal slice defines as		ܵ =
{ߣ|ߣ∗ < ߨ(ߣ|ݎ)}. 
3) Find an interval ܫ = (ܮ, ܴ) around ߣ଴ that contains all or much of the slice	ܵ. 
4) Draw the new point ߣଵ within interval	ܫ. 
5) Repeat steps 2 through 4 starting with new point ߣଵ until getting the desired 
number of samples. 
6) Find the mean and variance of occurrence rates from the resulted sample of step 
(5). 
In Markov model, there are relationships between probability of occurrences and 
occurrence rates (see Eq. ( 5-1)). In the three-state Markov model, if we assume that the 
occurrence of marine occurrences are homogeneous Poisson process with mean		ߣ௞௟ in 
matrix G, the state occurrence probabilities can be calculated as the elements of matrix 
P(t). 
ܩ = ൥
−(ߣଵଶ + ߣଵଷ) ߣଵଶ ߣଵଷ
0 −ߣଶଷ ߣଶଷ
0 0 0











1 − ߨଵଵ(ݐ) − ߨଵଶ(ݐ)
1 − ݁ିఒమయ௧
1
൪  ( 5-4) 
where	ߨ௞௟(ݐ) equals to the occurrence probability that is from state k to l at time t. 
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By slice sampling algorithm, we estimated the expected value of occurrence rates 
(incident rate, serious incident rate, and accident rate). Thereby, we put estimated 
occurrence rates in Kolmogorov equations and found the probability of occurrences by 
solving these equations. The solved occurrence probabilities represent the “Marine 
Risk.”  
ܴ݅ݏ݇(ݐ) = ߨଵଷ(ݐ) + ߨଶଷ(ݐ) ( 5-5) 
 
ܴ(ݐ) = 1 − ܴ݅ݏ݇(ݐ) = 1 − (ߨଵଷ + ߨଶଷ) ( 5-6) 
 
 
5.2. Case study 1: Accident risk model for Australian commercial 
vessels 
In this case, marine risk associated with three concepts of marine events: incident, 
serious incident and accident. There is a distinction between “accident” and “incident” 
in terms of the magnitude of consequences (Mullai and Paulsson 2011). We provide a 
definition for each of these events after reviewing different marine statistics and annual 
reports that are published by various marine organizations (e.g. ATSB1, TSBC2, 
EMSA3, HELCOM4, and AIBF5).  
                                                 
1Australian Transportation Safety Board 
2Transportation Safety Board of Canada 
3European Maritime Safety Agency 
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• Marine accident: 
An occurrence involving a vessel where: a person dies or suffers serious injury as 
a result of an serious incident occurrence associated with the operation of the vessel; or 
the vessel is destroyed or seriously damaged as a result of an occurrence associated with 
the operation of the vessel. 
• Marine incident: 
An occurrence, other than an accident, associated with the operation of a vessel 
which affects or could affect the safety of operation. This occurrence involves 
circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred. 
• Marine serious incident: 
An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred. 
 
5.2.1. Data and Case Description 
In this section, we use the proposed methodology with the purpose of accident risk 
estimation of Australian commercial vessels. We referred to marine research and 
analysis report of Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) in year 2011. In this 
report, data is provided for occurrences involving Australian flag ships operating as 
                                                                                                                                               
4Helsinky Commission 
5Accident Investigation Board of Finland 
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trading ships (cargo and/or passengers) around the world and trading vessels flying 
foreign flags within Australia’s maritime jurisdictions. 
Table  5.1 presents the number of occurrences from years 2005 to 2010 related to 
Australian vessels or vessels within Australian marine jurisdictions. In this table, the 
observed occurrences from S2 to S3 are given in the category of serious incident. The 
variations for incident and serious incident are insignificant, but it is sensible for 
accident rates. 
 
Table  5.1. Australian commercial shipping occurrences over the 5-year period (2005-2010) 
Occurrence type 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Accident 8 8 8 3 3 3 
Serious Incident 4 5 3 3 2 5 
Incident 81 98 81 65 94 72 
 
We considered uniform distributions for the prior distribution of occurrence rates, 
for example Uniform	(65,	98) for incident rate distribution. Then, we started slice 
sampling algorithm by considering and normalizing mean values of Uniform 
distributions as initial transition rates,		ߣ଴. The multinomial distribution was assumed as 
the likelihood distribution of occurrence rate vector	ߣ,	݂(ݎ|ߣ). Therefore, the occurrence 
numbers for each row k of matrix G are drawn from a multinomial distribution with 
probabilities: 
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(ݎ௞ଵ, ݎ௞ଶ, … , ݎ௞௟)	~	ܯݑ݈ݐ݅݊݋݈݉݅ܽ (ߨ௞ଵ(ݐ), ߨ௞ଶ(ݐ), … , ߨ௞௟(ݐ); ݎ௞) ( 5-7) 
 
5.2.2. Some numerical results 
After running the coded algorithm described in Section 2 in Matlab R2012a software 
for 1000 times, the resulted estimations of occurrence probability and rates over a 5-
year time span were shown in Figure  5-3. From MCMC simulation results for mean 
probabilities of marine occurrences in Australian waters, the determination of marine 
risk for next 5 years is possible. Based on simulation results, the mean probabilities for 
incident, accident, and serious incident were 0.1004, 0.0059, and 0.0069, respectively. 
The mean values can be interpreted as the “risk of marine occurrences” in 5 years. 
Commercial vessels moving in Australian waters are about 90% reliable not to face any 
incident, 99.4% reliable not to face any accident, and 99.3% reliable not to face any 
serious incident.  
As can be seen, the observed accident and serious incident rates gently change during 
the 5-year time span and their estimated values are nearly stabilized for the same 
duration. However, the averages of estimated accident and serious incident rates in five 
years are less than the average values of observed initial rates. Similarly, in comparison 
of the expected incident rates with the observed initial ones, the decreasing trend is 
clearly observable. This decrease of occurrence rates is consistent with what we expect 
to happen in real world. Marine occurrences are slightly decreasing because of IMO 
standards, industry initiatives and ever improving technology. 
 




Figure  5-3. Marine occurrence probabilities and occurrence rates for Australian commercial 
vessels in a 5-year time span resulted from 1000 runs of MCMC simulation 
 
We may observe the variation of probability and rate of the marine occurrences in 
different times by surface plots. In fact, the surface plotting is the generation of a 
mathematical surface to pass through, or close to, a set of existing elevation points. In 
this regard, the surface fitting tool in Matlab R2012a is used with the application of 
Biharmonic (v4) method under the category of interpolation fit. The contour plot, 
surface plot, and residual plot of simulated occurrence probabilities vs. time and 
occurrence rates are shown in Figure  5-4 to Figure  5-6.   




Figure  5-4. The contour plot, surface plot, and residual plot of simulated incident probability vs. time and incident rate 




 Figure  5-5. The contour plot, surface plot, and residual plot of simulated accident probability vs. time and accident rate 




Figure  5-6. The contour plot, surface plot, and residual plot of simulated serious incident probability vs. time and serious incident rate
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The results depicted in contour plots reveal that for more than 90% of the 
occurrence rates, the estimated occurrence probabilities locate in the same color contour 
regions. In other words, the occurrence probabilities remain stable while occurrence 
rates vary in time. For example, the contour plot for serious incident probabilities 
clearly applies to this fact. This means that the risk associated with serious incidents is 
almost constant during the 6 years. Intuitively, in surface plots, the contour regions with 
highest occurrence probabilities (surface peaks) are distinguished with higher level 
colors.  
 
5.2.3. Sensitivity analysis on model’s time span 
Recent work in the assessment of risk in maritime transportation systems has used 
simulation-based probabilistic risk assessment techniques (Merrick et al. 2005). In 
simulation-based models, we combine the characteristics of real marine accidents and 
make them act out a future event. Therefore, to investigate the applicability of the 
model and draw conclusions, a sensitivity analysis on main characteristics and 
assumptions is important. In other words, we should pinpoint which initial assumptions 
are appropriate candidates for additional data collection to narrow the degree of 
uncertainty in the results. 
In this section, a sensitivity analysis is carried out on time span of the model to 
see how it may effect on algorithm’s results. In numerical example, we considered a 5-
year time span for estimation of marine risks by running the slice sampling algorithm in 
1000 times. Without changing other initial assumptions, we changed the model’s time 
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span from 5 year to 20 year with the step length of half year (i.e. thirty one estimations 
for occurrence probabilities). It is noted that number of runs was fixed (1000 times) in 
every variation. At each time span, the model resulted different estimations for 
occurrence probabilities. We observed and saved the variations of occurrence 
probabilities in response to the changes of simulation time span. Mean and standard 
deviation of estimated incident and accident probabilities were calculated (see 
Table  5.2). Moreover, we set up ̅ݔ and (s) control charts for the estimated incident and 
accident probabilities by SPSS 20.0.0 software. Totally thirty one samples with thirty 
one observations (thirty one estimations for occurrence probabilities) were considered. 
The three-sigma control limits for ̅ݔ	and (s) were calculated and stated in Table  5.2. In 
this way, there is a 95% confidence that the estimated probabilities and the standard 
deviation values locate in between the control limits. 
 
Table  5.2. Statistical information of incident and accident probabilities over time 
(1-6) years statistical information Incident Accident 
Mean of probabilities (̅ݔ) 0.10030 0.00601 
Standard deviation (s) of probabilities 2.037E-03 4.573E-04 
Upper control limit for ̅ݔ 0.10646 0.00731 
Lower control limit for ̅ݔ 0.09414 0.00471 
Upper control limit for (s) 2.680E-03 4.971E-04 
Lower control limit for (s) 1.394E-03 4.175E-04 
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The statistical information shows that risks of incidents and accidents do not 
dramatically change with different time spans. This can be also interpreted as: although 
marine occurrence rates decrease through time (what we resulted in previous section), 
the estimated occurrence risk change slightly over time. Practically, this result is 
significant and observable in real. In spite of current safety improvements, still the risk 
of accidents and incidents exists. We cannot consider that this probability is going to 
significantly decrease or lead to zero through time.   
 
5.2.4. Sensitivity analysis on initial transition rates 
In most of the marine accident reports, number of accidents is updated by time (e.g. 
monthly, annually). Therefore, it is necessary to propose a model to be flexible in 
updating accident rates and probabilities by time. In this section, we investigate the 
effect of initial transition rate values on simulation results and estimations of 
probabilities.  
Slice sampling algorithm begins with a set of initial transition rates (ߣଵଶ, ߣଵଷ, 
and	ߣଶଷ). For example, mean value of Uniform	(ܽଵଶ, ܾଵଶ)	was assumed as the initial 
incident rate where ܽଵଶ and ܾଵଶ	are the minimum and maximum of incident rates in 
Table  5.1. In this section, the initial rates were changed (increased) by the step length of 
(௕ି௔ଶ଴ ) for 10 times. At each step, the time span of the model was considered to change 
from 5 to 10 years. MCMC simulation runs for 1000 times at each step. Figure  5-7 
includes the plots for the mean of occurrence rates (ߣଵଶ, ߣଵଷ, and	ߣଶଷ) versus time.  





Figure  5-7. Error bar plots of marine occurrence rates after running MCMC simulation with 
different initial rates 
 
The plots show symmetric error bars which can indicate the confidence intervals 
of resulted transition rates. As can be seen, mean values of occurrence rates have 
descending trends over the model’s time.  For example, mean of accident rates is 
decreased from 3.7 in 5 years to 1.7 in 10 years. On the other hand, at each time, the 
error bars are small and the mean variation is not significant. This means that by fixing 
the model’s time span, simulation results do not vary considerably when initial 
transition rates are selected at any point of uniform distributions. But when different 
time spans are considered, the rate’s reduction is expected and the model follows what 
happens by time in real world.   
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5.3. Case study 2: Accident risk model for vessels in Hong Kong 
waters 
5.3.1. Data and case description 
In this section, we use the proposed methodology for the accident risk estimation of 
vessels moving within Honk Kong waters. We referred to the accident reports by 
marine department, the government of Hong Kong special administrative region.  
International Maritime Organization (IMO) defines some of the key technical 
terms related to marine accidents which are as follows (Li, Meng et al. 2012): 
• Risk: combination of frequency and severity of consequences. 
• Accident: an unintended event involving fatality, injury, ship loss or damage, 
other property loss or damage, or environmental damage. 
• Consequence: outcome of an accident (In this case, death is considered as a 
consequence). 
• Frequency: number of occurrences per unit time (e.g., per year). 
• Hazard: a potential to threaten human life, health, property, or the environment. 
• Collision: striking or being struck by another ship, regardless of whether under 
way, anchored, or moored.  
• Contact: striking any fixed or floating objects other than those included under 
collision or grounding. 
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• Grounding: being aground or hitting/touching shore or sea bottom or underwater 
objects (wrecks, etc.). 
• Fire: incidents where fire is the initial event. 
• Explosion: incidents where explosion is the initial event. 
Table  5.3 presents the number of most significant marine occurrences within 
Hong Kong waters from years 1984 to 2011. In Table  5.3, the most marine occurrences 
involve as collision or contact, grounding or stranding, fire or explosion, and sinking or 
foundering. We considered this data as the number of transition from safe state to 
accident state in Markov model.  
 
Table  5.3. Number of most significant marine occurrences within Hong Kong waters 
Year Collision/Contact Grounding/Stranding Fire/Explosion Sinking/Foundering 
1984 136 13 15 15 
1985 116 18 17 24 
1986 151 15 18 27 
1987 145 21 20 27 
1988 150 25 11 24 
1989 165 13 24 30 
1990 126 16 23 25 
1991 163 14 19 20 
1992 209 29 16 26 
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1993 286 34 19 35 
1994 239 31 23 26 
1995 327 27 16 30 
1996 283 18 30 31 
1997 246 19 23 29 
1998 236 32 17 20 
1999 246 42 28 54 
2000 302 26 24 29 
2001 242 38 30 33 
2002 237 32 25 14 
2003 263 25 20 15 
2004 259 20 24 39 
2005 239 29 31 32 
2006 253 25 30 21 
2007 181 27 14 25 
2008 206 18 19 27 
2009 201 36 29 26 
2010 218 34 11 24 
2011 252 23 18 21 
 
From this data, the same distribution was assigned for transition from safe to 
vulnerable state. If a person killed or injured, then a transition from vulnerable state to 
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accident state was considered (serious accident).  In Figure  5-8, the transitions between 






Figure  5-8. Markov accident model (ߣ௞௟: occurrence rate from state k to state l). 
 
Data on number of these transitions is given in Table  5.4. The accident type 
grounding usually causes no fatality, however it is very common among marine 
accidents. Therefore, the risk of person injuries instead of death caused by grounding 








S1: Safety ߣଵଷ ߣଵଶ 
S3:  Accident  
ߣଶଷ 
S2: Vulnerable state 
Death 
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1984 3 0 2 0 
1985 1 0 0 1 
1986 2 0 0 5 
1987 1 0 0 3 
1988 2 0 0 0 
1989 9 0 1 1 
1990 1 0 0 3 
1991 3 0 1 0 
1992 2 0 0 0 
1993 6 0 0 1 
1994 2 0 0 0 
1995 5 2 0 3 
1996 2 0 0 0 
1997 5 0 0 1 
1998 5 0 0 1 
1999 11 0 3 0 
2000 0 2 2 0 
2001 0 0 1 0 
2002 14 2 0 2 
2003 0 2 2 0 
2004 0 3 1 0 
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2005 3 2 1 4 
2006 1 2 0 0 
2007 1 0 0 3 
2008 1 1 0 0 
2009 1 2 0 0 
2010 8 4 0 0 
2011 1 0 0 0 
 
 
5.3.2. Simulation inputs  
Slice sampling algorithm was encoded in Matlab R2012a software. The inputs of the 
algorithm for accident type collision/contact are given in Table  5.5. With the lack of 
knowledge, continuous uniform distributions were considered as priors. For example, 
the prior distribution of transition from state 1 (Safety) to state 3 (Collision) is Uniform 
(116,327). This represents the situation where number of collisions/contacts in the 
range between the minimum and maximum of observed data are equally likely.  
Multinomial distributions were assumed as the likelihood distribution of occurrence 
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for Transition Rates 
prior12 = @(G12) unifpdf(G12,116,327); 
prior13 = @(G13) unifpdf(G13,116,327); 
prior23 = @(G23) unifpdf(G23,0.01,14); 
Transition  
Rate Likelihoods 
P11 = @(G)  exp(-(G(1) + G(2)) * t); 
P12 = @(G)  G(1)/(G(1) + G(2) - G(3)) * exp(-(G(3) * t)) * (1 -     
exp(-(G(1) + G(2) - G(3)) * t)); 
P13 = @(G)  1 - G(1)/(G(1) + G(2) - G(3)) * exp(-(G(3) * t)) * (1 - 
exp(-(G(1) + G(2) - G(3)) * t)) - exp(-(G(1) + G(2)) * t); 
P22 = @(G)  exp (-(G(3) * t)); 
P23 = @(G)  1 - exp (-(G(3) * t)); 
Initial Transitions r = [200000,136,136;0,1000,3]; 
Posterior distribution post = @(G) mnpdf(r(1,:),[P11,P12,P13]) * 
mnpdf(r(2,2:3),[P22,P23])* prior12(G(1)) * prior13(G(2)) * 
prior23(G(3)); 
Initial Lambda (G) 
values  
Initial = [221.5,221.5,7]; 
Slice Sampling trace = slicesample(Initial,NMC,'pdf',post);         NMC = 1000; 
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Based on the average yearly arrival and departure patterns of ocean-going and 
river going vessels within Hong Kong waters, the initial transition from safe to safe 
state was considered as 200,000 transitions. Among these transitions, 136 
collisions/contacts were observed in year 1984. In addition, from average number of 
1000 crew members and passengers, 3 deaths were observed in year 1984. Therefore, 
vector (r) presented in Table  5.5 was considered as initial transition vector. 
In slice sampling algorithm, the mean values of prior distributions were 
considered as initial transition rate values. After 1000 Monte Carlo runs (NMC = 1000), 
the risk values at different years were estimated based on Eq. ( 5-5). The reliability of 
marine systems (e.g. vessels) while moving within Hong Kong water is also obtainable 
from Eq. ( 5-6) given in Section  5.1.2. 
 
5.3.3. Some numerical results 
After running the coded slice sampling algorithm in Matlab R2012a software for 1000 
times, the resulted estimations of occurrence probability for accident type 
collision/contact are shown in Figure  5-9.  
As can be seen, the mean probability of vulnerability and collision increase with 
the slightly same trend due to the similar prior distributions. With the effect of 
continuous Poisson process in Markov model, mean probability of death increases in 
time. As a result of increasing occurrence probabilities, the estimated risk values grow 
in time.  





Figure  5-9. Marine occurrence probability trends for vessels moving within Hong Kong waters 
resulted from 1000 runs of MCMC simulation 
 
The resulted risk estimations of collision/contact, grounding/stranding, 
fire/explosion, and sinking/foundering for 28 years (1984-2011) are shown in Table  5.6.  
The average estimated risks for collision/contact, grounding/stranding, 
fire/explosion, and sinking/foundering are 0.001311, 0.000165, 0.000142, and 
0.000182, respectively. Risk of collision/contacts is much higher that other types of 
accidents in Hong Kong waters. 
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1984 0.00074 0.00009 0.00010 0.00011 
1985 0.00078 0.00010 0.00009 0.00011 
1986 0.00080 0.00010 0.00010 0.00012 
1987 0.00084 0.00011 0.00010 0.00012 
1988 0.00089 0.00011 0.00010 0.00013 
1989 0.00092 0.00012 0.00011 0.00013 
1990 0.00097 0.00012 0.00011 0.00014 
1991 0.00102 0.00013 0.00011 0.00014 
1992 0.00105 0.00014 0.00012 0.00015 
1993 0.00110 0.00014 0.00012 0.00015 
1994 0.00116 0.00014 0.00012 0.00016 
1995 0.00117 0.00015 0.00013 0.00017 
1996 0.00124 0.00015 0.00013 0.00017 
1997 0.00128 0.00016 0.00014 0.00018 
1998 0.00131 0.00017 0.00014 0.00019 
1999 0.00137 0.00018 0.00015 0.00019 
2000 0.00143 0.00018 0.00015 0.00020 
2001 0.00146 0.00018 0.00016 0.00020 
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2002 0.00151 0.00019 0.00016 0.00021 
2003 0.00155 0.00019 0.00016 0.00021 
2004 0.00162 0.00020 0.00017 0.00022 
2005 0.00163 0.00021 0.00017 0.00023 
2006 0.00168 0.00021 0.00018 0.00023 
2007 0.00176 0.00022 0.00018 0.00024 
2008 0.00179 0.00022 0.00019 0.00024 
2009 0.00184 0.00023 0.00019 0.00025 
2010 0.00186 0.00024 0.00020 0.00025 
2011 0.00193 0.00024 0.00020 0.00026 
 
Table  5.7 shows the ratios between different number of marine occurrences and 
the ratios between estimated marine occurrence risks. As can be seen, the average 
estimated value of risk ratios and the average value of marine occurrence ratios are 
noticeably close. The closeness of these two values to each other, to a large extent, 
supports the validity and usefulness of risk results. On the one hand, using statistics 
such as expected value of number of occurrences alone is not enough for risk analysis 
and risk management discussions. And, on the other, other criteria to be used for risk 
estimation such as those (based on probabilities) in this thesis should also reflect the 
changes of statistics and show similar behaviour.  
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Table  5.7. Comparison matrix of estimated accident risk ratios and marine occurrence ratios 
Occurrence Collision/ Contact Grounding/ 
Stranding 




















1 1 7.94 8.68 9.23 10.23 7.20 8.11 
Grounding/ 
Stranding 
1/7.94 1/8.68 1 1 1.16 1.17 0.91 0.93 
Fire/ 
Explosion 
1/9.23 1/10.23 1/1.16 1/1.17 1 1 0.78 0.79 
Sinking/ 
Foundering 
1/7.2 1/8.11 1/0.91 1/0.93 1/0.78 1/0.79 1 1 
 
5.3.4. Sensitivity analysis on initial transition value 
One of the main problems in a Bayesian statistical analysis is the robustness of 
estimates with respect to data and model errors (Bardossy et al. 1991). It is necessary to 
propose a Bayesian-based model to be flexible in updating accident rates and 
probabilities by time. In this section, we investigate the effect of initial transition values 
on simulation results and estimations of probabilities. Slice sampling algorithm begins 
with a set of initial transition vector r = [200000, 136, 136; 0, 1000, 3]. Sensitivity 
analysis is done on the variation of initial number of transitions. Based on the statistical 
report published by marine department in Hong Kong in 2011, almost 200000 arrival 
and departure patterns of ocean-going and river going vessels within Hong Kong waters 
(i.e. safe transitions) were observed. However, this approximation is less for the 
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previous decades. Therefore, the value of safe transitions is increased by steps of 10000 
transitions up to 200000 transitions and at each step, different risks are estimated.  
Figure  5-10 shows the sensitivity analysis results for collision risk estimations. Also, in 
Figure  5-11, Figure  5-12, and Figure  5-13 the estimations of grounding, fire, and 
sinking risks for different initial transition numbers are shown, respectively.   
 
 
Figure  5-10. Collision risk estimations for different number of vessels moving within Hong 
Kong waters 




Figure  5-11. Grounding risk estimations for different number of vessels moving within Hong 
Kong waters 
 
Figure  5-12. Fire risk estimations for different number of vessels moving within Hong Kong 
waters 




Figure  5-13. Sinking risk estimations for different number of vessels moving within Hong Kong 
waters 
 
As can be seen, risk would clearly decrease by increasing number of safe 
transitions. For showing better the risk decline, trend lines were added to the scatter 
charts in Matlab R2012a. The fitted trend line equations and the goodness of the fits are 
shown in Table  5.8.  
The sensitivity analysis shows that the proposed approach does not require any 
information on safety factors of the marine system. It is quite simple to find the 
relations of changed inputs of the model with the accident risk. Most of the recent risk 
models were proposed for the specific types of accidents or vessels. Our model has this 
advantage that it can generally consider any accident. 




Table  5.8. Estimated fitting curves for different accident risks with the goodness of fit results 
Type of risk General Exponential model 
f(x) = a*exp(b*x) + c*exp(d*x) 
Coefficients (with 95% confidence bounds)
Goodness of fit 
Collision 
Risk 
a =     0.01043  (0.006861, 0.014) 
b =  -3.842e-05  (-4.376e-05, -3.308e-05) 
c =    0.001426  (0.001339, 0.001513) 
d =  -4.564e-07  (-7.727e-07, -1.402e-07) 
SSE: 2.203e-10 
R-square: 0.9994 




a =   0.0003541  (0.000244, 0.0004642) 
b =    -2.3e-05  (-3.09e-05, -1.51e-05) 
c =   0.0001576  (0.0001277, 0.0001875) 
d =    1.27e-07  (-7.076e-07, 9.616e-07) 
SSE: 4.233e-12 
R-square: 0.9986 
Adjusted R-square: 0.9982 
RMSE: 6.858e-07 
Fire Risk a =   0.0003444  (0.0003149, 0.000374) 
b =  -1.914e-05  (-2.262e-05, -1.566e-05) 
c =   0.0001344  (0.0001116, 0.0001573) 
d =   5.816e-09  (-6.873e-07, 6.99e-07) 
SSE: 1.024e-12 
R-square: 0.9998 




a =   0.0007933  (0.0004094, 0.001177) 
b =  -3.335e-05  (-4.163e-05, -2.508e-05) 
c =   0.0002021  (0.0001826, 0.0002217) 
d =  -5.464e-07  (-1.026e-06, -6.64e-08) 
SSE: 6.264e-12 
R-square: 0.9988 








In this chapter, a new approach including Markov model and MCMC simulation is 
presented to estimate accident risks of marine transportation systems. For the case 
studies, initial data are collected from ATSB annual reports and from accident reports 
by marine department, the government of Hong Kong special administrative region. 
However, this model is applicable for any database in which marine accidents are 
recorded indifferent of their types and severities. MCMC simulation was applied for 
estimation of occurrence rates and probabilities.  
For the first case study, sensitivity analysis on the time span of MCMC simulation 
showed accident and incident risks were remained constant in different time spans. 
Also, sensitivity analysis on initial transition rates showed that marine occurrence rates 
generally decrease by time. However, the simulated result of occurrence rates at each 
time does not affected considerably by initial rates. For the second case study, 
sensitivity analysis on initial input of MCMC simulation showed accident risks 
decreased exponentially over different number of vessels moving in the region. 
There are two main advantages with the approach presented in this chapter. First, 
in the current risk estimation methods, many safety factors are involved in models that 
make these methods complicated. In practice, we should look for an easy-usable 
comprehensive method for risk estimation that it is even applicable without having 
enough information on effecting factors. The approach of this thesis does not require 
any information on safety factors of the system. Second, most of the recent risk models 
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were proposed for the specific types of accidents or vessels. Our model has this 
advantage that it can generally consider any accident or marine system.  
Overall, the approach of this thesis intends to fill the gap when there is a lack of 
information related to the 'safety factors' of the system. The proposed approach has the 
potentiality to consider any incident/accident in the Marine system. The research in this 
study could have potential application in other sectors such as oil or gas industry, and 












CHAPTER 6: AVAILABILITY ASSESSMENT AND 
DESIGN OF MARINE MULTI-STATE SYSTEMS 
 
In this chapter, first, we present a dynamic model to assess the availability of multi-state 
weighted K-out-of-N systems as a kind of marine transportation system. Second, 
regarding to the dynamic property of the systems and its components, we find the 
optimal design of the components by using Genetic algorithm. In the dynamic model, 
we change the probabilities and utilities of components in different states over time. For 
availability assessment, we use universal generating function and Markov process. We 
apply the proposed models to one real-world marine transportation system in order to 
evaluate and compare them in assessing systems’ availability.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. Section  6.1 presents a dynamic 
model to assess the availability of multi-state weighted K-out-of-N systems. In 
Section  6.2, a dynamic design problem is introduced to be solved by genetic algorithm. 
In Section  6.3, one real-world numerical example from maritime transportation system 
is used to apply the dynamic availability model. Conclusions are provided in 
Section  6.4. 
• Nomenclatures 
ܰ: The number of components of the system. 
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ܯ: The best operating state for the components of the system,	ܯ + 1: Total number of 
states.  
݅:	Index of component number in the system	1 ≤ ݅ ≤ ܰ. 
݆: Index of component state in the system	0 ≤ ݆ ≤ ܯ. 
ܿ௜: The design and manufacturing cost of component	݅. 
௝݇ :	The minimum total capacity required to ensure that the system is in state j or above. 
ܥ௝: Cost of system being in state below j (Cost of failure). 
ܣ(ݐ): Availability of a multi-state K-out-of-N system at time t. 
݇(ݐ):	The demand capacity to ensure that the system is working properly at time t. 
ݑ௜௝: Capacity of component i in state j. 
ݑ௜௝(ݐ): Capacity of component i in state j at time t. 
݌௜௝: Probability of component i being in state j. 
݌௜௝(ݐ): Probability of component i being in state j at time t. 
ߣ௝,௞௜ : Transition (failure) rate of component i from state j to state	݇ (݆ > ݇). 
ߤ௝௞௜ : Transition (repair) rate of component i from state j to state	݇ (݆ < ݇). 
ߔ: The system’s structure function representing the state of the system. 
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K: Total capacity of all components of the system. 
ܣመௌ௬௦: The minimum required probability for the system to attain a state of j or above. 
ܥௌ௬௦: Total cost of the system. 
 
6.1. Dynamic availability model 
In weighted K-out-of-N systems, each component of the system and the whole 
system have	(ܯ + 1)	states: 0, 1, 2… M. In Figure  6-1, a general Markov model for a 
system with ܰ components and with	(ܯ + 1)	states is presented. Component ݅(1 ≤ ݅ ≤
ܰ) in state ݆(0 ≤ ݆ ≤ ܯ) has a capacity value of		ݑ௜௝. System is in state j or above if the 
total capacity of all components is larger than or equal to the value		 ௝݇. Then, this 
definition means: 
ܲݎ{ߔ ≥ ݆} = ܲݎ൛ܭ ≥ ௝݇ൟ ( 6-1) 
 
 In dynamic availability assessment of multi-state weighted K-out-of-N systems, 
we consider a time function for probability distribution of component i in state j 
as	݌௜௝(ݐ). The probability functions ݌௜௝(ݐ)	of the components are obtained from 
Chapman-Kolmogorov equations. Then, the system probability function is obtained 
from system Universal Generating Function (UGF). 
 
















   
Figure  6-1. A general Markov model for a system with N components, e.g. if all components are 
in state	(ܯ − 1), then the system is in state j or above if		 ௝݇ = ܰ(ܯ − 1), ݑ௜(ெିଵ) = ܯ −
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According to the definition of the system, the sum of all state probabilities at any 




= 1 ( 6-3) 
 We solve equations ( 6-2) and ( 6-3) simultaneously, with the initial conditions: 
݌௜ெ(0) = 1,… , ݌௜௞(0) = 0,… , ݌௜଴(0) = 0, ( 6-4) 
and get the state probability function 	݌௜௝(ݐ)	for	݅ = 1,… ,ܰ	and	݆ = 0,… ,ܯ. 
For the component i in state j, UGF links probability		݌௜௝(ݐ) to the capacity 




 ( 6-5) 
 We consider a marine transportation system with M + 1 different states 
(0,1,… ,ܯ), where state M is the perfect functioning state and state 0 is the completely 
failure state. In dynamic case, the system UGF can be re-written as: 
௦ܷ௬௦(ݖ, ݐ) = ߗ൫ ଵܷ(ݖ, ݐ), ܷଶ(ݖ, ݐ), … , ܷே(ݖ, ݐ)൯











 ( 6-6) 
where		߶(∙) is the so called system structure function. For multi-state weighted K-out-
of-N system, the structure function is: 
߶൫ݑଵ௝భ, … , ݑே௝ಿ൯ =෍ݑ௜௝೔
ே
௜ୀଵ
 ( 6-7) 
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 Once the UGF of the multi-state K-out-of-N system is obtained, the availability 
of the system is determined as the probability that the system at instant t is in one of the 
acceptable states: 
ܣ(ݐ) = ܲݎ൛߶൫ݑଵ௝భ, … , ݑே௝ಿ൯ − ݇(ݐ) ≥ 0ൟ ( 6-8) 
where		݇(ݐ)	is the system demand at time t. 
 
6.2. Dynamic design problem 
In commonly design problems of multi-state systems, goal is to determine and design 
optimal system based on two evaluation elements: availability/reliability and cost. In 
this study, we consider these two elements in an optimal design problem for multi-state 
weighted K-out-of-N systems which have not yet been studied as a dynamic problem.  
Li and Zuo (2008b) presented two optimization problems for design of multi-state 
weighted K-out-of-N systems in non-dynamic cases. In this study, we improve the 
problem and find the optimal distribution of components’ probabilities and utilities as 
functions of time. The dynamic design optimization problems are formulated as: 





+ ൫1 − ܣ(ݐ)൯. ܥ௝ ( 6-9) 
Subject to: 









= 1,			0 ≤ ݌௜௝(ݐ) ≤ 1				(݅ = 1,2, … ,ܰ; ݆ = 0,1,2, … ,ܯ)
ݑ௜଴(ݐ) = 0, ݑ௜௝(ݐ) ≥ 0	 (݅ = 1,2,… , ܰ; ݆ = 0,1,2,… ,ܯ) 													
 ( 6-10) 
 















= 1,			0 ≤ ݌௜௝(ݐ) ≤ 1				(݅ = 1,2, … ,ܰ; ݆ = 0,1,2, … ,ܯ)
ݑ௜଴(ݐ) = 0, ݑ௜௝(ݐ) ≥ 0	 (݅ = 1,2,… , ܰ; ݆ = 0,1,2,… ,ܯ) 													
 ( 6-11) 
 
In above problems, the availability of the system,	ܣ(ݐ),	can be obtained from Eq. 
( 6-8). Similar to Li and Zuo (2008b), we refer to Mettas (2000) and define the cost of 
components in terms of considering the relationship between design variables 
(component availability and utility) and component cost. The formulation of Mettas 
(2000) has been extended to equations below to be compatible with dynamic problem: 
ܿ௜௉(ݐ) = ݁ݔ݌ ቈ(1 − ௜݂).
∑ ݌௜௝(ݐ)ெ௝ୀଵ − ݌௜೘೔೙(ݐ)
݌௜೘ೌೣ(ݐ) − ∑ ݌௜௝(ݐ)ெ௝ୀଵ
቉ ( 6-12) 
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ܿ௜௎(ݐ) = ௜݃݁ݔ݌ ቈ෍ ݌௜௝(ݐ)ݑ௜௝(ݐ)
ெ
௝ୀଵ
− ݑ௜೘೔೙(ݐ)቉ ( 6-13) 
where ݌௜೘೔೙(ݐ) and ݌௜೘ೌೣ(ݐ) are respectively the minimum and maximum availability 
of component ݅ in the normal state during the interval (0, ݐ]; ݑ௜೘೔೙(ݐ) is the minimum 
capacity of component ݅ in the normal state during the interval (0, ݐ]; ௜݂ and ݃௜ are 
respectively the feasibility of increasing the availability and capacity of component ݅; 
and respectively, ܿ௜௉(ݐ) and ܿ௜௎(ݐ) are cost of component ݅ associated with the 
availability and capacity at time t. 
The defined component cost function describes the general behaviour of the component 
cost over time when actual distribution is not available.  
ܿ௜(ݐ) = ܿ௜௉(ݐ) + ܿ௜௎(ݐ) ( 6-14) 
 Meta-heuristic optimization techniques are more powerful than other methods for 
solving large-scale and complex optimization problems. Among the meta-heuristic 
optimization techniques, genetic algorithm (GA) is most widely applied due to the 
flexibility in modelling and global optimization ability. In this thesis, GA is adopted to 
solve the dynamic problem.  
 
6.3. Numerical case study 
Our numerical example is from a real world application case in maritime transportation 
in naval shipyard Gdynia of Poland. The naval shipyard consists of two transportation 
systems to move the ships coming for repair to the designated location (Blokus-
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Roszkowska and Kolowrocki 2010). The ship-rope elevator is used to dock and undock 
ships coming to the Naval Shipyard in Gdynia for repairs. The elevator is composed of 
a steel platform carriage and 10 rope-hosting winches fed by separate motors.  
The rope transportation system is composed of three broaching machines working 
independently. This system is used to transfer ships coming to the shipyard for repairs 
from platform to the repair post and back from repair post to the platform.  
Generally all actions taken to the ships coming to the shipyard for repairs can be 
divided into 5 tasks: 
• Task 1 – ship docking (rope elevator is working) 
• Task 2 – ship’s transportation to the repair post (rope transportation system is 
working) 
• Task 3 – the repair measures (both systems are not working) 
• Task 4 – ship’s transportation to the platform (rope transportation system is 
working),  
• Task 5 – ship undocking (rope elevator is working). 
During ship docking, the ship settled in special supporting carriages on the 
platform is raised to the wharf level and then the ship is transferred from the platform 
with the rope broaching machine on a traverser. After that, the ship with the traverser, 
on which the ship is settled, is shifted in the repair post direction. Then after stretching 
the ropes from the ship to the broaching machine through some blocs, the ship is 
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transferred from the traverser to the repair post. After some repair measures, the ship is 
transferred back to the traverser and then on the platform. Finally, during undocking the 
ship on the platform is moved down to the water.  
There are nine repair posts, denoted by symbols R1-R9. The first repair post R1 
can be lengthening to the post R1/B1 for long ships. There are also available two repair 
depots denoted by symbols B and D. Generally all kind of repairs can be carried out in 
any repair post. The repair posts R1 and R2 are equipped in crane. The submarines are 
repaired in the depot. Additionally large vessels are transferred to the repair post R1/B1. 
The broaching machines in the transportation system are numbered 1, 2, and 3. At 
least two broaching machines will be used to transport the ships on the traverse. The 
three broaching machines are differentiated in terms of capacity. Each of the broaching 
machines has 4 different states, namely state 3, 2, 1 and 0.  
In some systems, the components of the system can still contribute some basic 
utilities to the system even in the lowest state. However, in this example, the 
performance or utility of each broaching machine in state 0 was assumed as 0. Different 
weights are assigned to the machines at different states. Therefore, the system under 
consideration is a typical weighted 2-out-of-3 system.  
In dynamic model, we assumed the state probabilities of broaching machines 
change exponentially by time. The Markov transition graph of the dynamic model is 
shown in Figure  6-2.  
 




Figure  6-2. Markov model of the state transitions of broaching machines in dynamic system 
 
Sate 0 is called the complete failure state, and state 3 is the perfect functioning 
state. States 1 and 2 are known as partial failure states. In states 1 and 2, broaching 
machines still operate but such operations with low performance levels. In constructing 
such transition graph, we assumed that the broaching machine was repairable only if it 
completely failed.  
 
6.3.1. Availability assessment of broaching machine system 
In this section, we apply the presented dynamic model of section  6.1 for availability 
assessment of broaching machine system. In this model, probability distributions of the 
three broaching machines (M1-M2-M3) in each of the four states (S0-S1-S2-S3) are 
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exponential with given transition rates. In Table  6.1, the transition rates in addition of 
performance rates (utility values) of the three machines are given.  
 
Table  6.1. Transition and performance rates of broaching machines 
Broaching Machines  Transition Rates (1/yr)  
Types States S3 S2 S1 S0 Performance Rates 
M1 
S3 0 2 1.3 0.7 2000 
S2 0 0 0.9 0.5 1500 
S1 0 0 0 0.3 1000 
S0 4.2 0 0 0 0 
M2 
S3 0 1.8 1.1 0.8 2200 
S2 0 0 0.8 0.4 1400 
S1 0 0 0 0.2 1200 
S0 7.2 0 0 0 0 
M3 
S3 0 2.2 1.6 0.9 2500 
S2 0 0 1.2 0.7 2000 
S1 0 0 0 0.5 1500 
S0 5.4 0 0 0 0 
 
Chapter 6: Availability Assessment and Design of Marine Multi-state Systems 
138 
 
We have the following set of equations: 
ௗ௣೔య(௧)
ௗ௧ = −൫ߣ௜ଷ,ଶ + ߣ௜ଷ,ଵ + ߣ௜ଷ,଴൯݌௜ଷ(ݐ) + ߤ௜݌௜଴(ݐ)  
ௗ௣೔మ(௧)
ௗ௧ = ߣ௜ଷ,ଶ݌௜ଷ(ݐ) − ൫ߣ௜ଶ,ଵ + ߣ௜ଶ,଴൯݌௜ଶ(ݐ)             
ௗ௣೔భ(௧)
ௗ௧ = ߣ௜ଷ,ଵ݌௜ଷ(ݐ) + ߣ௜ଶ,ଵ݌௜ଶ(ݐ) − ߣ௜ଵ,଴݌௜ଵ(ݐ)  
ௗ௣೔బ(௧)
ௗ௧ = −ߤ௜݌௜଴(ݐ) + ߣ௜ଷ,଴݌௜ଷ(ݐ) + ߣ௜ଶ,଴݌௜ଶ(ݐ) + ߣ௜ଵ,଴݌௜ଵ(ݐ)  
 
( 6-15) 
݌௜ଷ(ݐ) + ݌௜ଶ(ݐ) + ݌௜ଵ(ݐ) + ݌௜଴(ݐ) = 1 ( 6-16) 
  
The initial state probabilities of the machines are: 
	݌௜ଷ(0) = 1, 	݌௜ଶ(0) = 0, ݌௜ଵ(0) = 0, and ݌௜଴(0) = 0 ( 6-17) 
 
Then, we solved the set of above equations by using Eigen-value method in 
Matlab R2012a and obtained the state probability results of the three broaching 
machines as depicted in Figure  6-3. 
The performance UGF of each broaching machine is: 
• Machine 1: 
ଵܷ(ݖ, ݐ) = ݌ଵଷ(ݐ)ݖଶ଴଴଴ + ݌ଵଶ(ݐ)ݖଵହ଴଴ + ݌ଵଵ(ݐ)ݖଵ଴଴଴ + ݌ଵ଴(ݐ) ( 6-18) 
• Machine 2: 
ܷଶ(ݖ, ݐ) = ݌ଶଷ(ݐ)ݖଶଶ଴଴ + ݌ଶଶ(ݐ)ݖଵସ଴଴ + ݌ଶଵ(ݐ)ݖଵଶ଴଴ + ݌ଶ଴(ݐ) ( 6-19) 
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Figure  6-3. State probability distributions of broaching machines for the dynamic system 
 
• Machine 3: 
ܷଷ(ݖ, ݐ) = ݌ଷଷ(ݐ)ݖଶହ଴଴ + ݌ଷଶ(ݐ)ݖଶ଴଴଴ + ݌ଷଵ(ݐ)ݖଵହ଴଴ + ݌ଷ଴(ݐ) ( 6-20) 
The UGF of the system as the product of the UGF for three broaching machines is: 
௦ܷ௬௦(ݖ, ݐ) = ߗ൫ ଵܷ(ݖ, ݐ), ܷଶ(ݖ, ݐ), ܷଷ(ݖ, ݐ)൯ ( 6-21) 
Incorporating UGF equations, we have: 
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௦ܷ௬௦(ݖ, ݐ) = ߗ ቀ൫݌ଵଷ(ݐ)ݖଶ଴଴଴ + ݌ଵଶ(ݐ)ݖଵହ଴଴ + ݌ଵଵ(ݐ)ݖଵ଴଴଴
+ ݌ଵ଴(ݐ)൯, ൫݌ଶଷ(ݐ)ݖଶଶ଴଴ + ݌ଶଶ(ݐ)ݖଵସ଴଴ + ݌ଶଵ(ݐ)ݖଵଶ଴଴
+ ݌ଶ଴(ݐ)൯, ൫݌ଷଷ(ݐ)ݖଶହ଴଴ + ݌ଷଶ(ݐ)ݖଶ଴଴଴ + ݌ଷଵ(ݐ)ݖଵହ଴଴
+ ݌ଷ଴(ݐ)൯ቁ 
( 6-22) 
Finally, the availability of the system can be determined from the system UGF 
depending on the minimum system’s performance or utility ( ௝݇(ݐ)). To show the 
availability as a function of time and minimum performance level, we used a three-
dimensional plot, shown in Figure  6-4.  
Figure  6-4. Availability of the dynamic broaching machine system under different 
utilities and times 
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We moved through the axis “Time” from 0 to 4 years. At the same time, we 
changed the minimum required utility values from 1000kg to 6000kg. As can be seen, 
the availability of the broaching machine system is almost less than 0.6 for all values of 
minimum utility after year 3. There is a same story for availability of the broaching 
machine system when minimum system utility gets values less than 2000 at any time 
between 0 and 4 year.  
 
6.3.2. Optimal design of broaching machine system 
In this section, the marine company decided to install a new system of broaching 
machines. The new installation would be a four-state weighted 2-out-of-3 system. 
However, in design problem, the availability and utility distribution of the broaching 
machines in different states are unknown. In this case, we evaluated different systems in 
time (dynamically) and find the optimal design (availability and utility distributions) of 
the broaching machines.  
As described in Section ( 6-20), we used GA approach from the GA toolbox in 
Matlab R2012a to solve the dynamic design problems. Before, the problems were 
written into the penalty function forms to make calculations easier.  
• Problem P1  
Minimize: 
ܥ௦௬௦ = ∑ ܿ௜(ݐ)ே௜ୀଵ + ൫1 − ܣ(ݐ)൯. ܥ௝ + ݉ܽݔ(ܣመ௦௬௦ − ܣ(ݐ), 0) ∗ ߟ  ( 6-23) 





ெ௝ୀ଴ = 1,			0 ≤ ݌௜௝(ݐ) ≤ 1 (݅ = 1,2, … , ܰ; ݆ = 0,1,2,… ,ܯ)	
ݑ௜଴(ݐ) = 0, ݑ௜௝(ݐ) ≥ 0		(݅ = 1,2,… ,ܰ; ݆ = 0,1,2,… ,ܯ) 										  ( 6-24) 
 
• Problem P2 
Minimize: 
−ܣ(ݐ) + ݉ܽݔ ൭෍ܿ௜(ݐ)
ே
௜ୀଵ







= 1,			0 ≤ ݌௜௝(ݐ) ≤ 1 (݅ = 1,2, … ,ܰ; ݆ = 0,1,2, … ,ܯ)	
ݑ௜଴(ݐ) = 0, ݑ௜௝(ݐ) ≥ 0		(݅ = 1,2,… ,ܰ; ݆ = 0,1,2,… ,ܯ) 														
 ( 6-26) 
 
In penalty functions,	ߟ	is a very large number (e.g. ߟ = 99999). Other parameters 
of the problems are given in Table  6.2. In dynamic design, the optimal solutions are 
highly dependent on the demand of the system at each time (݇(ݐ)) especially when 
other parameters of the problem such as	ݑ௜௠௜௡(ݐ), ௜ܲ௠௜௡(ݐ), and ݌௜೘ೌೣ(ݐ) are considered 
constant. System demand is a changing factor to system availability (see Eq. ( 6-8)). We 
assume that the demand distribution is uniformly distributed between 500 and 2500 ton 
i.e. the cumulative distribution function of the demand is: 
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Table  6.2. Parameters in the optimization design problem of broaching machine system  
௜݂ 	 ݃௜	 ݑ௜௠௜௡(ݐ) ௜ܲ௠௜௡(ݐ) ݌௜೘ೌೣ(ݐ) ܣመ௦௬௦	 ܥ௝	 ܥመ௦௬௦







݂݋ݎ ݇(ݐ) < 500
݂݋ݎ 500 ≤ ݇(ݐ) < 2500
݂݋ݎ ݇(ݐ) ≥ 2500
 ( 6-27) 
After developing the objective functions and their constraints, we used the GA 
toolbox in Matlab R2012a to solve the problems. We ran these programs using a 
computer with 3.30GHZ CPU and 8.00GB RAM under the Windows 7 Enterprise 
operating system. We set the population data type at double and population size at 100. 
Elite count and crossover fraction were all set at the default values in Matlab R2012a 
GA toolbox. The uniform function was used as the population creation function. The 
adaptive feasible function was used as the mutation function. The rank function was 
used as the scaling function. The scattered function was used as the crossover function. 
The stochastic uniform function was used as the selection function. The stopping 
criteria were 5000 generations, and 5000 stall generations.  
The optimization results of problems 1 and 2 for a selected time (t = 2) are 
presented in Table  6.3 and Table  6.4, respectively.  
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Table  6.3. Optimization results of the design problem 1 (broaching machines’ utility and 
availability) 
Reliability = 0.9677 k(t = 2) = 3000 
Cost = 7.354 j = 0 j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 
Utility 
N = 1 0 0 1834 1834 
N = 2 0 1165 1166 1173 
N = 3 0 1834 1834 2999 
Availability 
N = 1 0.0033 0.0007 0.4632 0.5338 
N = 2 0.0139 0.2081 0.3598 0.4192 
N = 3 0.0201 0.3562 0.4814 0.1433 
Table  6.4. Optimization results of the design problem 2 (broaching machines’ utility and 
availability) 
Reliability = 0.9597 k(t = 2) = 3000 
Cost = 7.298 j = 0 j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 
Utility 
N = 1 0 0 2121 2234 
N = 2 0 261 2312 2720 
N = 3 0 1878 1919 1922 
Availability 
N = 1 0 0 0.4672 0.5338 
N = 2 0.0008 0.4263 0.1814 0.3915 
N = 3 0.0991 0.2069 0.3781 0.3159 
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In dynamic model, there are 21 decision variables in each time that all are in non-
linear non-integer optimization problems. It is difficult to use traditional optimization 
approaches for solution, but by using GA, they were all solved in about 4min. In this 
example, number of broaching machines is set to 3. When 2 more machines are 
considered and other parameters remain the same, there are 35 variables in each 
optimization model, and completing the computation takes about 7 min. When number 
of variables increases to 70 and all the other parameters remain the same, completing 
the computation takes about 16 min. This shows that in spite of the large system, the 
GA approach can still solve these optimization problems.  
From the result tables, it can be seen that the optimization problems that minimize 
the total cost have a lower total cost than optimization problems that maximize the 
system’s availability. On the other hand, the optimization problems that maximize the 
availability are better able to attain that goal than optimization problems that minimize 
the total cost. This is reasonable, because obviously when the only objective is to 
minimize the total cost, the requirements for the system’s availability are sacrificed by 
just giving a constraint for that availability. That constraint is usually selected not to be 
too high in order to avoid infeasibility. In similar, when the objective function is to 
maximize the availability of the system, some requirements for limiting the total cost 








In this chapter, dynamic modeling is considered for availability assessment of marine 
multi-state K-out-of-N systems. As in real world most of the components’ 
characteristics change by time, we may consider most systems as dynamics. However, 
up to now, the modeling in availability assessment of multi-state K-out-of-N systems 
has been non-dynamic. Therefore, first we present an approach for availability 
modeling of dynamic systems by Markov modeling of the system and using UGF. The 
results given in the numerical example illustrate the flexibility of dynamic modeling in 
assessing availability. Then, by using the dynamic availability assessment model, we 
look for an optimal design of the multi-state weighted K-out-of-N systems in dynamic 
case. 
The optimization problem presented in this chapter is to minimize the expected 
total system cost subject to system reliability requirements. The objective is to find the 
optimal design of the systems when state probabilities and costs of components vary in 
time. For problem solution, GA is used due to the flexibility in modelling and global 
optimization ability. The results showed that optimal design for dynamic systems 
depends on cost of design at different times. This means that against the non-dynamic 
optimal design that the best solution of the problem is only one design, dynamic 
optimal design is not necessarily only one best solution of the problem during the time. 
The results validate that looking at the systems dynamically, gives us the real optimal 
system designs.      
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS 
  
7.1. Conclusions 
In this thesis, human and organizational factors in marine accidents are analyzed 
quantitatively; the accident risk for the marine transportation systems is modeled; and 
the availability of marine transportation systems is assessed in a dynamic model for 
further availability and cost based design of the components of these systems. 
Chapter 3 presents a model to assess the contribution of Human and 
Organizational Factor (HOF) to accidents. The proposed model is made up of two 
phases. The first phase is the qualitative analysis of HOF responsible for accidents, 
which utilizes Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) to seek out 
latent HOFs. The hierarchy of HOFs identified in the first phase provides inputs for the 
analysis in the second phase, which is a quantitative analysis using Bayesian Network 
(BN). BN enhances the ability of HFACS by allowing investigators or domain experts 
to measure the degree of relationships among the HOFs. In order to estimate the 
conditional probabilities of BN, fuzzy analytical hierarchy process and decomposition 
method are applied in the model. Case studies show that the model is capable of seeking 
out critical latent human and organizational errors and carrying out quantitative analysis 
of accidents. From the application of the model to the two case studies, it can be 
concluded that the model is useful in investigating HOFs for the derivation of safety 
interventions. Thereafter, corresponding safety prevention measures are derived. 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and future works 
148 
 
Chapter 4 proposes a bi-objective optimization problem to plan the container ship 
capacities during transportation of hazardous materials from supplier storages to 
customer storages. The expected risk as an objective function of this problem is 
proposed based on the water area exposed by hazmat containers accidents and it 
depends on sea pollution factors. In between of the storages, port terminals are 
considered to show that how objective functions may effect on the optimum number of 
containers. The optimal number of containers with different freights (hazmat and 
regular) is found by solving a bi-objective integer programming problem.  
Chapter 5 studies accident risk of marine transportation systems and presents a 
new model to estimate accident probabilities. The model includes a three-state 
homogeneous Markov model and slice sampling algorithm as a MCMC simulation 
method. For two case studies, the proposed model is applied and sensitivity analyses are 
done. Sensitivity analyses on the inputs and assumptions of the model shows how the 
model behaves in various conditions and for different collected data. In addition, the 
proposed model is applicable even having no data on safety factors such as type of 
human errors. The proposed approach has the potentiality to consider any 
incident/accident of marine transportation systems.  
Chapter 6 studies a dynamic model for availability assessment of multi-state 
weighted K-out-of-N systems with a case study in marine transportation. To the present 
time, the availability assessment of this kind of systems was in non-dynamic ways. In 
this chapter, a dynamic availability assessment model is presented by Markov modeling 
of the system and using Universal Generating Function (UGF). The results given in the 
numerical example illustrate the flexibility of dynamic modeling in assessing 
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availability. Moreover, the problem of optimal design of the components is solved by 
using Genetic algorithm, regarding the dynamic property of the marine multi-state 
weighted K-out-of-N system and its components. The optimization problem is to 
minimize the expected total system cost subject to system availability requirements. 
The results showed that optimal design for dynamic systems depends on cost of design 
at different times. This means that against the non-dynamic optimal design that the best 
solution of the problem is only one design, dynamic optimal design is not necessarily 
only one best solution of the problem during the time. The results validate that looking 
at the systems dynamically, gives us the real optimal system designs.       
 
7.2. Future works 
This section discusses the limitations of the works contained in this thesis and suggests 
some directions for future research. 
In Chapter 3, a model is presented to quantify human errors which contributed to 
the accidents in marine transportation industry. All calculations and model’s steps are 
done by using different software packages. The lack of unique software for the 
implementation and evaluation is quite apparent. Future work is suggested to be done 
on developing specific software which facilitates the application of the proposed model. 
In addition, the elicitation of conditional probability table is still subjective and time 
consuming. Other methods of reducing subjective biasness and improving efficiency in 
CPT elicitation deserved to be further explored. It would be interesting to build a 
standardized accident reporting system and collect enough HOF data of accidents. 
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In Chapter 4, the algorithm adapted for solving this problem is good enough in 
case of small and medium size networks. It is suggested by the authors to evaluate the 
efficiency of this algorithm for the large size networks or to improve and validate the 
solution approach by application of heuristic algorithms.  
In Chapter 5, it is assumed a three-state Markov model for accident risk modeling 
of marine transportation systems. The states are safe, vulnerable, and serious accident. 
These three states are general and observable in the lifetime of many systems. That is 
why the proposed approach in this chapter has potential application in other sectors 
such as oil or gas industry, and other systems such as the railways and road 
transportation systems. In spite of vast applicability of current Markov model, extension 
of this model to Markov models with more states of failure or accidents can be 
suggested. A challenging issue regarding to this extension is the computational 
complexity of the approach while incorporating Markov model with MCMC 
simulation.  
In Chapter 6, a dynamic model is presented for the availability assessment and 
design of multi-state weighted K-out-of-N systems in marine transportation. There are 
situations where these systems are connected together and make a network system in 
marine transportation. For example, a multi-state system of generators is operating in 
connection with a multi-state system of electric engines in a ship. Evaluating network 
availability can be an interesting topic in these situations regarding to the planning, 
designing, and control of network systems. Further study can be done to extend the 
dynamic model of this thesis to the availability assessment and component design of 
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